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FOREWORD
Western military forces and security and intelligence agencies are justifiably concerned about two
phenomena that continue to affect their ongoing
asymmetric conflicts with jihadist terrorist organizations: 1) the increasing diffusion and application of
expertise acquired by jihadists in fabricating “improvised explosive devices” (IEDs), and 2) the extent to
which local jihadist cells in the West may or may not
be connected to veteran terrorist groups and networks
in other countries and regions. This monograph by
Dr. Jeffrey M. Bale argues that these two issues are, in
fact, interrelated. Using the March 2004 Madrid train
bombings and the two failed July 2006 train bombings
near Cologne as contrasting case studies, Bale argues
that jihadist cells whose members are linked organizationally, logistically, or operationally to wider terrorist networks, especially ones comprising well-trained
and battle-tested operatives, are much more likely
to be able to acquire the levels of technical expertise
needed to manufacture effective IEDs, carry out devastatingly successful single IED attacks, and perhaps
even sustain longer-term IED bombing campaigns.
Although these conclusions might seem to be selfevident, they, in fact, challenge the widespread notions
that amateur would-be bomb makers using the Internet are likely to be able to carry out highly destructive IED attacks or IED campaigns without having received any hands-on training from professionals, and
that today supposedly “self-generating” jihadist cells
made up of “bunches of [regular] guys” with no significant connections to larger networks of extremists
constitute the principal terrorist threat to the West.
Although autonomous groups of relative amateurs,
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or even ideologically-motivated lone individuals, can
occasionally carry out one or two devastating bomb
attacks, cause significant casualties, and create other
security problems because they may be able to operate “under the radar” beforehand, the most serious
terrorist threats, IED or otherwise, stem from jihadist cells with a web of interconnections to networks
of veteran terrorists, including those with operational
and bomb making expertise. As a result, determining
the type and degree of connectivity between particular
jihadist cells and wider terrorist networks is of great
importance in assessing their probable operational effectiveness. In order to shed more light on this matter,
Bale develops a new categorization scheme herein for
assessing different types and levels of local cell connectivity.
This monograph was funded by the Department
of Defense in connection with a larger project the purpose of which was to help military units and security
agencies better assess and cope with the growing IED
threat, both overseas and at home.
			

			
			
			

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
During the past 2 decades, two interrelated security threats have emerged that Western democracies
will likely be forced to contend with for the foreseeable future. The first of these threats is multifaceted
inasmuch as it stems from a complex combination of
religious, political, historical, cultural, social, and economic motivational factors: the growing predilection
for carrying out mass casualty terrorist attacks inside
the territories of “infidel” Western countries by clandestine operational cells that are inspired ideologically by, and sometimes linked organizationally to,
various jihadist networks with a global agenda. The
most important of these latter networks is still the late
Usama bin Ladin’s high-profile group Qa‘idat al-Jihad
(The Base [or Foundation] of the Jihad), together with
its many organizational offshoots and regional affiliates. The second threat is more narrowly technical: the
widespread fabrication of increasingly sophisticated
and destructive improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
by those very same jihadist groups, devices which—
if properly constructed—are capable of causing extensive human casualties and significant amounts of
physical destruction within their respective blast radiuses. The purpose of this monograph is to examine
these dual intersecting threats within the recent European context in an effort to assess what they might
portend for the future, including the U.S. homeland.
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JIHADIST CELLS AND “IED” CAPABILITIES IN
EUROPE: ASSESSING THE PRESENT
AND FUTURE THREAT TO THE WEST
BACKGROUND
During the past 2 decades, two interrelated security threats have emerged that Western democracies
will likely be forced to contend with for the foreseeable future. The first of these threats is multifaceted
inasmuch as it stems from a complex combination of
religious, political, historical, cultural, social, and economic motivational factors: the growing predilection
for carrying out mass casualty terrorist attacks inside
the territories of “infidel” Western countries by clandestine operational cells that are inspired ideologically by, and sometimes linked organizationally to,
various jihadist networks with a global agenda. The
most important of these latter networks is Usama bin
Ladin’s high-profile group Qa‘idat al-Jihad (The Base
[or Foundation] of the Jihad), together with its many
organizational offshoots and affiliates. The second
threat is more narrowly technical: the widespread fabrication of increasingly sophisticated and destructive
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by those very
same jihadist groups, devices which (if properly constructed) are capable of causing extensive human casualties and significant amounts of physical destruction
within their respective blast radiuses. The purpose of
this monograph is to examine these dual intersecting
threats, above all within the recent European context,
in an effort to assess what they might portend for the
future, including for the U.S. homeland. Specifically,
the goal herein will be to assess the extent to which
members of more or less autonomous jihadist cells
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are likely to be able to make a transition from carrying out single attacks with IEDs, which some analysts
believe is not particularly difficult, to launching more
sustained “IED campaigns,” which most specialists
agree would require considerably more expertise and
resources to manage.
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PART I:
INTRODUCTION
This monograph is organized into four parts. Part
I seeks to clarify various preliminary conceptual issues, ranging from the appropriateness of the definitions of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to the
factors involved in their employment and diffusion.
Part II deals, relatively briefly, with the question of
whether would-be jihadists can fabricate an effective,
sophisticated, or destructive IED merely by following
the instructions in a hard copy or online instruction
manual, or whether they generally need to get handson technical training from an experienced bombmaker
in order to be able to make really devastating devices.
Part III, the heart of the report, deals with the thorny
question of whether jihadist cells in Europe really are
amateur “self-starter” groups of kinsmen and friends
that are not linked organically to professional terrorist networks, as Marc Sageman argues; whether they
generally are linked to such networks, as Bruce Hoffman suggests; or whether they fit into neither of those
paradigms comfortably. This is necessary because determining the level of professionalism of cell members
is likely to be of seminal importance if one is attempting to assess their capabilities for: (1) manufacturing
sophisticated IEDs, and (2) launching sustained IED
campaigns. Hence two illustrative cases are examined
herein in more detail. Part IV then offers some tentative conclusions that might enable security officials
to formulate more accurate threat assessments concerning potential future IED attacks and campaigns
in the West.
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DEFINITIONAL AND CONCEPTUAL
PROBLEMS WITH THE TERM
“IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE”
The first key issue to be dealt with is how, precisely, to define and delimit the application of the
term “Improvised Explosive Device.” According to
the definition being used by the National Academies,
the term seems to refer both to: (1) explosive devices
that are hand-made, artisanal, or “improvised” with
respect to their manufacture, i.e., that are not prefabricated according to specifications on a factory assembly line, like conventional military munitions, or (2)
conventional explosive devices, including military
grade explosives and military munitions (e.g., artillery shells) that are used in innovative, unconventional, or improvised ways, i.e., not in the way in which
they are designed for use in the course of conventional
military operations but rather in an unconventional
manner in the context of irregular, unconventional,
or asymmetric warfare.1 While one need not object
in principle to this sort of formulation, the problem
is that virtually any kind of explosive device that is
manufactured or used by nonstate groups in more or
less nonconventional ways can now be placed willynilly into the “IED” category. This raises two questions: (1) are there any types of explosive devices used
by insurgent or irregular forces that do not fall into the
“improvised” category, and, (2) if not, have we simply
created a trendy new buzzword covering every type
of bombing carried out by guerrillas, insurgents, irregulars, and terrorists?
Given the penchant for creating acronyms by U.S.
Government agencies, especially the Department
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of Defense (DoD), does the use of the term IED really add any precision or “scientific” value to earlier
ways of describing or characterizing such devices or
attacks? For example, is there any advantage in employing the term Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive
Device (VBIED) to refer to an old-fashioned car or
truck bomb, or in using the term Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED) to refer to a “suicide
bomber”? One wonders.
The second conceptual point to make is that IEDs,
however the term is defined, can be employed both in
“normal” instrumental acts of violence (e.g., simply to
eliminate, destroy, or damage particular human and
nonhuman targets) and in bona fide acts of terrorism,
i.e., acts of violence for psychological effect in which the
perpetrators’ primary purpose is to influence the perceptions and behavior of a wider target audience or
audiences.2 It is important to distinguish conceptually
between standard acts of violence that involve only
two parties, the perpetrator(s) and the victim(s), which
technically do not constitute acts of terrorism, and acts
of terrorist violence which invariably involve three
parties, the perpetrator(s), the victim(s), and the wider
target audience(s) upon whom the perpetrator(s) intentionally aim to exert a psychological impact. Given
their dramatic effects and destructive power, IEDs are
obviously well suited for both types of attacks.3
UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES DO
NONSTATE GROUPS EMPLOY IEDS?
When considering the prior and likely future use
of IEDs in attacks by insurgents or terrorists, one must
carefully evaluate the role played by: (1) operational
objectives; (2) ideological factors; (3) organizational
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factors, which are especially relevant to the matter of
operational capabilities and available resources; and
(4) environmental and contextual factors.
Operational Objectives and IED Use.
There is no real mystery about why particular insurgent groups (or, for that matter, their opponents)
have often had recourse to making and employing
IEDs. The primary reasons why diverse extremist and
opposition groups have chosen to employ such devices are that IEDs are relatively easy to manufacture
and deploy, relatively cheap to fabricate, and have repeatedly proven, in a multitude of different historical,
cultural, and operational contexts, to be highly effective.4 Explosive devices, improvised or not, enable the
groups employing them—assuming that their members are minimally competent in operational and technical matters—to successfully attack and harm their
targets or, in the case of terrorism proper, to affect the
psychological state, perceptions, and behavior of the
target audiences they are trying to influence. In short,
from a narrowly tactical or operational point of view,
the decision to employ IEDs often appears to be quite
rational: Groups believe that they can get a lot of “bang
for the buck” and thereby accomplish their operational
objectives. Hence the difficult question to answer is not so
much why certain groups might use IEDs, but rather why
other groups might decide not to. From a strictly operational standpoint, the only reasons why groups might
refrain from using IEDs is because they fear alienating
the sympathies of their base of supporters by carrying
out indiscriminate bomb attacks, or they have already
become accustomed to using and hence continue to
prefer to use other signature tactics that they consider
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effective. In other words, the “operational signature”
or “operational profile” of particular groups is in certain cases based on the use of other types of weapons
and tactics, not IEDs. For example, the leftist Brigate
Rosse (Red Brigades [BR]) preferred to kidnap, “kneecap,” or assassinate individuals whom they felt were
representatives of the “imperialist state of the multinationals,” i.e., functionaries of the “oppressive”
capitalist class or the “bourgeois” democratic state
which was supposedly beholden to that class. The
BR did not have any fundamental ideological objections to or moral qualms about using explosives, but
it was simply not the group’s preferred tactic.5 Moreover, recent self-proclaimed offshoots of the BR, the
so-called “new” BR, have likewise not yet resorted to
mass casualty attacks or the use of sophisticated IEDs,
even though one of those offshoots—the Nuclei Territoriali Antiimperialisti (Anti-Imperialist Territorial
Cells [NTA])—has bombed several parked automobiles and specifically advocated an alliance between
Western left-wing radicals and the “anti-imperialist”
fighter Usama bin Ladin.6 This suggests that the mere
diffusion of IED knowledge and technology will not
necessarily cause extremist groups that have historically preferred other methods to employ IEDs in mass
casualty attacks.
Ideological Factors in IED Use.
The question here is whether particular extremist or insurgent groups have any moral reservations
about, or ideological/theological objections to, the
likely causing of inadvertent loss of life (collateral
damage) or mass casualties as a result of IED attacks.
In the case of jihadist groups, however, this is not an
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issue: They have neither moral nor ideological objections to carrying out public bombings using IEDs
against “infidels,” including within the dar al-harb
(abode of war, i.e., portions of the world in which the
shari‘a does not hold sway and where unbelievers are
not paying the jizya or poll tax to signal their submission), because they believe that both killing and terrorizing infidels is specifically sanctioned by passages
in the Qur’an and/or by supporting ahadith (accounts
of what Muhammad allegedly said or did).7 Furthermore, on the basis of Islamic “just war” conceptions of
proportionality with respect both to scope and means,
jihadist spokesmen have openly proclaimed that they
have the right to kill millions of Americans, including by means of the use of so-called “weapons of mass
destruction” (WMD).8 Moreover, both Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri have sought to provide
explicit theological-legal justifications for killing both
American civilians (including women and children)
and Muslims who are living in targeted regions of
the dar al-harb.9 Add to that a host of semi-rational or
non-rational “expressive” impulses or motives, e.g., a
desire to cleanse the world of corruption by exterminating unbelievers, obsessions with getting revenge
for real or imagined crimes, a passion for martyrdom,
or the desire to precipitate an apocalyptic end-of-days
scenario, and one can easily conclude that the jihadists have no ideological restraints whatsoever that
might inhibit them from causing mass, indiscriminate
casualties.10 If such repeated pronouncements are not
alone sufficient to convince every careful observer, all
one has to do is look at their normal modus operandi,
which is characterized by the widespread employment of IEDs to cause mass casualties and/or traumatize target audiences on virtually every front where
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jihadists are waging armed struggle, from Algeria to
Iraq, from Afghanistan to Chechnya, from Kashmir to
Thailand, and from Europe to Indonesia.
Organizational Factors in IED Use.
In many contexts the most important organizational issue that could affect the use and impact of
future IED attacks is the extent to which the jihadist
groups emerging in particular areas have had or will
in the future develop tangible links to more professional terrorist networks and groups, either in their
own region or elsewhere. Most analysts have been fixated on the question of whether Qa‘idat al-Jihad has
provided, or will henceforth be providing, direct or
indirect operational and logistical assistance to homegrown jihadist cells in other parts of the world, but it
would be a serious mistake to overlook or minimize
the possible connections between newly-formed jihadist cells and professional terrorist groups based
in places like Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Chechnya, or
Kashmir. At this juncture, debates continue to rage between those researchers who argue that many, if not
most, of the supposed “self-starter” jihadist groups in
various regions have in fact had documented links to
cadres of Qa‘idat al-Jihad, which in its most extreme
formulations could lead to the conclusion that Usama
bin Ladin and his organization’s majlis al-shura (consultative council) are directly ordering, tangibly assisting, or even secretly “teleguiding” jihadist attacks
in various countries, and those who claim that the
attacking cells, although clearly inspired by the ideology of global jihad (specifically jihadist Salafism),
were not connected organizationally or logistically to
Qa‘idat al-Jihad.11 As will later become clear, the actual
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situation on the ground generally lies somewhere between these two interpretive poles—e.g., at least two
members of the “bunch of guys” that carried out the
7/7 suicide bombings in London reportedly traveled
to Pakistan and made contact with jihadist militants
there, including those at a Lashkar-i Tayyiba (Army of
the Pure [LeT]) madrasa near Lahore12—but this sort of
question obviously cannot be answered in a general or
abstract way: Only careful and thorough qualitative empirical research on a case-by-case basis can shed sufficient
light on these complex matters, and each case is likely to
be different from the others and, virtually by definition, unique in certain respects. One single interpretative framework therefore does not and cannot fit every individual case, though after carefully examining
a variety of such cases one may eventually be able to
discern and identify broader trends.
The reason why this organizational issue may well
be of considerable importance is because it seems a
priori probable that cells connected in various ways
with veteran, professional terrorist groups or networks, or whose members have received hands-on
instruction in jihadist training camps, would be better
able to construct more effective IEDs (in terms of their
overall destructive power and anti-personnel effects)
and/or plan more devastatingly effective attacks, e.g.,
a near simultaneous series of bombings, bombings
involving secondary and tertiary explosions that are
designed to kill emergency personnel and onlookers
who rush to the scene of the initial bombing, a more
skillful deployment of chemical agents or radiological
dispersion devices (RDDs), etc. This does not mean,
of course, that a small group of resourceful (and perhaps lucky) amateurs would necessarily be unable to
carry out a highly destructive and bloody attack that
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ended up having a traumatic psychological impact or
affecting government policies. If one accepts the problematic thesis of Marc Sageman and Scott Atran, for
example, that the Madrid bombings were carried out
by a relatively amateurish “bunch of guys” with only
tenuous links to other jihadist organizations—a topic
that will be investigated further below13—it is obvious
that even amateurs can carry out a highly successful,
near simultaneous bomb attack using fairly simple
homemade IEDs. However, even if a particular “selfstarter” group was able to carry out one successful IED
attack, even a major one, it is questionable whether it
would be able to carry out sustained IED campaigns.
Environmental and Contextual Factors in IED Use.
The continent of Europe, like North America, constitutes an almost ideal operating environment within
which to plan and carry out IED attacks. Apart from
the fact that jihadists consider all of Europe (excepting Bosnia and Albania) to be “infidel territory” and
most European governments to be key participants in
the “Zionist-Crusader war against Islam,” European
countries offer many other advantages as IED targets.
First, they are unusually rich in targets of both tangible
and symbolic importance, ranging from sophisticated
public transportation systems that ferry millions of
civilians back and forth on a daily basis, to the innumerable symbols of Europe’s past glory (such as the
Vatican) and present power (such as financial centers
and military bases). Second, the freedoms provided
by Western democratic societies enable extremist and
subversive groups of various types, including Islamist
networks, to operate with relative freedom of action
and impunity (despite the prodigious and sometimes
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effective efforts of various European secret services
to monitor their activities). In particular, Islamist
radicals (including future would-be jihadists) find it
easy to exploit the European legal and welfare systems to promote their extremist agendas and engage
in anti-democratic activities, and they likewise find it
relatively easy to “hide in plain sight” in ghettoized
Muslim communities on the peripheries of major European cities.14 Moreover, even when they are arrested
and brought to trial, the nature of European judicial
systems and the political proclivities of many judges
often combine to make it hard to prosecute them successfully. So it is that such radicals can systematically
take advantage of the very freedoms that they detest
in order to identify, conduct surveillance of, and eventually attack a multitude of potentially vulnerable and
highly-desirable targets.
PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON IED
DIFFUSION: HOW ARE IED KNOW-HOW
AND TECHNOLOGY SPREAD?
At first glance one might either assume or hypothesize that information about how to construct IEDs,
or the actual technologies needed to fabricate them,
would be likely to spread in one of two ways. First,
they could spread outward from particular geographic
locales where insurgents or terrorists had already developed a certain amount of expertise in constructing
and employing IEDs (or perhaps where they had access to certain materials needed to manufacture them
that were unavailable elsewhere), which would mean
that one could probably trace their diffusion spatially from particular geographic centers, first to adjacent and thence to further removed territories. This
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would also imply that, temporally, those techniques
would spread outward through a relatively gradual
process. Second, they could be spread in conjunction
with the movements of particular individuals who already had expertise in creating and deploying IEDs,
whether those movements conformed to predictable
patterns or were more random. In such a situation,
the spread of IED know-how would not necessarily
be characterized by a gradually expanding process of
diffusion outwards from a particular epicenter, but instead move along the circuitous paths taken by those
individuals. In that sense, knowledge would be more
likely to “jump” spatially and thereby be transmitted
somewhat more rapidly than in the aforementioned
diffusion pattern. For example, if an IED expert traveled from al-’Anbar province in Iraq to a destination
in Europe or Southeast Asia, his knowledge and expertise would be likely to move and potentially be
spread along with him. But this would not necessarily
follow an easily discernible pattern, and unless U.S.
intelligence agencies were somehow able to monitor
the movements of such individuals it might be very
difficult for them to glean where and when this accumulated know-how might appear or be transmitted
next. In this second type of “personal” diffusion, the
appropriate analogy might be to tracing the spread of
infectious diseases by following the travel itineraries
of infected individuals.
However, in today’s Internet era, the processes of
IED knowledge and technology diffusion are arguably less likely to conform to such traditional patterns
of technological diffusion. Unfortunately, it is now
possible for individuals all over the world to access
the Internet and get information therein about how to
obtain chemicals and other materials needed for IEDs,
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as well as detailed instructions for actually fabricating them. In short, the diffusion of rudimentary IED
know-how no longer primarily depends, as it generally had in earlier eras, on its gradual expansion
outwards from specific geographic nodes, the physical movements of knowledgeable and experienced
people, or, perhaps, on the potentially traceable and
therefore risky acquisition of obscure and often illegal
hard copy bomb making manuals. Nowadays locating information about how to construct home-made
bombs is as easy as clicking on a URL from a desktop
or portable computer, perhaps one at an Internet café
on which time has been rented under a fictive name
and paid for with cash. This is certainly something
that many “wanna-be” jihadists do these days.
Perhaps the most important question, then, is
whether one needs to obtain actual hands-on training from an explosives expert to be able to construct
highly effective IEDs, or whether one can do so simply
by carefully following the instructions provided in an
online IED manual. This is a question that technical
experts are perhaps best able to answer, although one
would suspect that efforts by rank amateurs to learn
how to construct and deploy IEDs, especially amateurs without any prior scientific or technical background, are in general not likely to lead to optimal results in terms of achieving their operational objectives,
whether those objectives be causing mass casualties,
destroying targeted facilities, traumatizing target audiences, or some combination thereof. Indeed, efforts
by untrained amateurs to fabricate IEDs solely from
online instructional materials are likely to lead, perhaps not infrequently, either to premature accidental
detonations and the resultant maiming or death of the
would-be bomb-maker, or to the mistaken fabrication
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of bombs that then fail to detonate. Moreover, until
they have acquired more firsthand operational experience in deploying IEDs and created an efficient logistical infrastructure of some type, it will likely be more
difficult for self-styled revolutionaries or “mujahidin”
to launch sustained IED campaigns even if they are
capable of launching successful single IED attacks.
Of course, one of the main characteristics of IEDs
is that they are “improvised.” This implies that there
are innumerable new and creative ways to make explosive devices by employing a wide variety of chemicals and household objects, not to mention actual
military munitions. In that sense, it may not always
be the slavish imitation of devices and techniques that
have previously been used and disseminated by others, including professional bombmakers, but rather
the innovative development of entirely new types of
devices and techniques by clever amateurs with technical skills, which ends up creating significant new
terrorist threats. In that sense, the only certain limits
that can be placed on the ability to construct and deploy IEDs, apart from the laws of physics and access
to a minimal amount of resources, are those of the human imagination itself. As has already become clear
in Iraq, different groups of insurgents are both very
adaptive and very innovative in terms of employing
locally available materials in creative ways and devising techniques to circumvent U.S. efforts to discover
IEDs, dismantle them, or jam the signals that are used
to detonate them. At a 2006 conference in Monterey,
California, a British munitions expert explained just
how easy it was to fabricate devastatingly effective
IEDs, how difficult it was to identify, disarm, or defuse them, and how adaptable the insurgents had become in finding ways to deal with sophisticated Coali-
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tion countermeasures, both human and technical. This
provides yet another illustration, if any was needed,
that the ongoing process of mutual learning and adaptation between adversaries in warfare shows no signs
of abating.15 It also indicates that battle-hardened and
creative insurgents, however rigid and fanatical they
may be from an ideological standpoint, can eventually
find ways of adapting or effectively responding, in the
operational realm, to the immense technological superiority of U.S. and Western armies, and that a complex
array of human factors, both tangible and intangible,
will remain decisive elements in the outcome of present and future conflicts.
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PART II:
INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL
LEARNING ABOUT IEDs
Not all terrorists learn, and those that do appear
limited in their ability to do so.
				

—Michael Kenney16

One issue raised in the introduction was whether
members of terrorist cells would need to receive direct
personal training from individuals with actual expertise, i.e., with significant prior hands-on bombmaking
experience, in order to learn how to fabricate effective
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) themselves. It
would be rash to draw categorical conclusions about
this matter, since certain talented amateurs have in the
past sometimes been capable—and will no doubt in
the future also sometimes be capable—of manufacturing very destructive IEDs, either by imaginatively applying their existing levels of technical knowledge or
by following detailed step-by-step instructions found
in manuals, even without having had the benefit of direct personal instruction from an experienced bombmaker. Nevertheless, the question is not whether such
amateurs might occasionally be able to fabricate such
devices, which is a certainty, but rather how frequently they are likely to be able to do so.
Hence a brief discussion should be undertaken
about the general importance of individual learning
and organizational learning in terrorist groups. Alas,
not enough in-depth research has as yet been carried
out on the specific processes by which members of terrorist groups, or their organizations as a whole, actu-
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ally acquire, analyze, share, and apply knowledge, in
part because most of the existing literature on social
learning and organizational behavior has been focused
on relatively large, stable, formal, and bureaucratized
organizations instead of on small, sectarian, violenceprone political or religious groups that are compelled
to operate clandestinely or covertly in hostile law enforcement and military environments. Such groups
are usually characterized by ideological extremism,
authoritarian and often charismatic leadership, insularity, internal factionalism leading to organizational
fission and fusion, compartmentalization on a need-toknow basis, and intense intra-group social dynamics.
Oftentimes, it has simply been assumed that terrorist
groups will continue to learn, like most supposedly
“rational” actors, as time progresses. However, there
is no doubt that different terrorist groups, including
those that emerge from within the same ideological
milieu, do not all learn vital skills and important lessons at the same rate. Nor, for that matter, do they
all learn equally well. Thus it should not simply be
assumed a priori that particular terrorist groups are
invariably learning what they need to know and then
effectively applying what they have learned, all the
more so given that social learning tends to be “sensitive to a variety of individual and institutional impediments, including bounded rationality, coalition
dynamics, and organizational inertia.”17
However that may be, in the context of both individual learning and organizational learning, an
important preliminary distinction must be drawn
between what has generally been referred to as “explicit knowledge” and that which has been dubbed
“tacit knowledge.”18 Explicit knowledge refers to
formal knowledge about how to do something that
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can be effectively codified in various formats and can
thence be transmitted easily to others. In contrast, tacit
knowledge is more informal personalized knowledge
gained through sometimes unique individual experiences, which often manifests itself in the form of
subjective insights, intuitions, and hunches, that are
harder to formalize and hence much harder to transmit fully to others.19 An example of explicit knowledge, with respect to IEDs, would be the information
found in hard copy or online manuals that provide
detailed instructions about how to make bombs. An
example of tacit knowledge would be the “tricks of
the trade” painstakingly acquired over a period of
years by veteran, highly-skilled bomb makers, which
are likely to include all sorts of innovative, flexible,
and adaptive techniques, nuances, and insights, many
of them idiosyncratic, that are not to be found in standardized manuals. Diligent students might eventually
succeed in learning the basics of bomb making from
such manuals, but they would only be able to learn
and master the many subtleties associated with tacit
knowledge if they received personal training from, or
perhaps even became the protégés of, an experienced
bomb maker or, alternatively, after practicing extensively for a considerable period of time and thereby
acquiring valuable firsthand experience. Moreover,
according to a team of RAND Corporation experts,
“[a]cquiring new information, knowledge, or technology from an explicit source is usually only a group’s
first step. The group must then develop enough tacit
knowledge within its ranks to be able to apply the information effectively.”20
Another, older scheme that was designed to draw
a distinction between book learning and experiential
learning has recently been resuscitated by Michael

19

Kenney, who argues that the terms explicit and tacit
knowledge should be replaced by the ancient Greek
terms techne and mētis. Although techne is very similar
to the notion of explicit knowledge, in that it focuses on
abstract technical knowledge or “know what” that is
structured in “small, explicit, logical steps” which can
be broken down, verified, and therefore easily communicated, mētis is arguably a more subtle, nuanced
version of tacit knowledge.21 Like the latter, mētis focuses on intuitive, practical knowledge or experiential “know how” that one acquires by doing, but it
especially emphasizes that this involves a “cunning”
or “crafty” intelligence which is manifested through
traits such as dexterity, ingenuity, improvisation, and
overall adaptability.22 Such attributes must be present to enable insurgent terrorists to learn quickly and
respond effectively to government countermeasures.
Unlike techne, which consists of codified knowledge
that can be acquired by “reading manuals and other
documents that provide detailed, step-by-step” instructions, mētis must be shared—to the extent that it
can be shared—by experienced practitioners through
sustained interaction with others, including less experienced acolytes.23 In the words of Kenney:
‘Veterans’ tell ‘novices’ stories about their past experiences; they demonstrate how to perform specific
tasks; and they mentor aspiring fanatics by building
social relationships with them. Like tailors, midwives,
butchers, and photocopy technicians, terrorists share
mētis by participating in ‘communities of practice,’ social communities formed by veterans and novices that
interact on a regular basis, creating and re-creating experiential knowledge expressed in shared narratives,
practices, and routines.24
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This distinction between techne and mētis is obviously
very relevant to the terrorist use of IEDs.
Thus far the focus has been on the individual
learning of bomb making and related skills, but it is
necessary to emphasize that organizational learning
is also of vital importance for terrorist organizations.
This is because insurgent terrorist groups operate
within a fluid, dynamic, and adversarial conflict environment characterized by interactive processes of
thrust-and-parry, action-and-reaction, or responseand-counter-response—in short, a complex process of
“competitive adaptation”—between their own operatives and the security forces of the regimes they are
fighting.25 If they do not continue to learn and adapt,
insurgent groups are not likely to be able to prevail
against the generally superior forces and greater resources fielded by the state. What is being referred to
herein as organizational learning has been defined by
Brian Jackson and a team of RAND researchers as “a
process through which a group acquires new knowledge or technology that it then uses to make better
strategic decisions, improve its ability to develop and
apply specific tactics, and increase its chance of success in its operations.”26 These same authors further
emphasize that “learning at the organizational level
is more than simply the sum of what each individual
member knows or can do [because an] organization is
a system that structures, stores, and influences what and
how its members learn.”27
It follows that in order to learn, terrorist groups,
as organizations, must engage in some process to ensure that the information they acquire is effectively
processed and applied. The RAND researchers have
characterized this as a fourfold process that involves
acquiring information and knowledge from both exter-
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nal and internal sources; interpreting that information
properly; distributing it to members of the organization that need access to that information; and then
storing the information through various means for
future collective retrieval.28 The information that has
thereby been learned and retained can then be used to
facilitate the group’s ability to perform several vitally
important functions—to develop, improve, or employ
new weapons or tactics in order to change its capabilities over time; to improve the skills of its members so
that they can better apply current weapons or tactics;
to collect and utilize the intelligence information needed to mount operations effectively; to thwart countermeasures and hence improve its chance to survive
efforts to destroy it; and to preserve the capabilities
it has already developed even if key individual members are lost.29 If it is able to build significant expertise
within the group, whether through learning by doing,
offering basic or specialized training to raise the skill
sets of its members and thereby reduce their chances of
making mistakes, or carrying out after action reviews
to learn from its past successes and failures, it will be
able to increase its operational effectiveness considerably and thereafter carry out increasingly destructive
and/or complex attacks.30
Note, however, that the organizational learning
processes discussed by Jackson and his colleagues
might be more relevant and applicable to larger insurgent terrorist groups with greater resources than
to small, more or less autonomous jihadist cells.31
Smaller, more transitory ad hoc groups may not need
to survive for as long a period, much less to evolve
and become increasingly effective, especially if their
handful of members intend to martyr themselves in
the process of carrying out a terrorist attack. If, on the
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other hand, they hope to survive, sustain themselves,
and remain active for a longer period, they too would
benefit from instituting a process of organizational
learning, albeit on a smaller scale, in order to increase
their operational capabilities and successfully adapt
and respond to changing situations. Even in that case,
however, the fact that these types of cellular organizations are relatively tiny means that the mechanisms
necessary to maintain organizational learning, and in
particular to distribute knowledge to members and
store it collectively, are likely to be far more rudimentary. In such a case all that is arguably necessary is
for key personnel, including bomb makers and operational leaders, to survive so that the cell can maintain
itself in being, recruit new members, and continue to
operate.
Hence, in the context of small ad hoc jihadist cells
in Europe, organizational learning—in contrast to
individual learning—might at first sight appear to
be less difficult to attain than would be the case for
larger, more dispersed, and more functionally specialized terrorist organizations. On the other hand,
precisely because such cells are small, geographically
concentrated, and relatively noncompartmentalized,
they may be far more vulnerable to penetration, covert manipulation, or eventual destruction by the security forces. For that very reason, the maintenance of
tight organizational and operational security is perhaps even more essential, at least in the short term,
precisely because of the relative paucity of skilled
personnel in such cells. After all, if the only effective
organizer, operational planner, or experienced bomb
maker within a cell is captured or killed, that alone
might make it impossible for the remaining members
to carry out successful terrorist attacks.
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In contrast to the scheme presented by Jackson and
his team, Kenney has instead formulated a three-stage
process of terrorist organizational learning. From this
perspective, “individuals acting on behalf of collectives gather, share, and apply information and experience to their activities, frequently in response to
environmental feedback.”32 He also emphasizes that
the actual mechanisms associated with this process
are related to certain characteristics of jihadist terrorist groups:
Existing research suggests that jihadists and terrorists
connect to like-minded militants through friendship
and kinship ties, as well as social affiliations based
on common religious or ethnonational backgrounds,
geographic proximity, and shared experiences. Network ties among participating “nodes” are sustained
and deepened through regular interactions, including
communication, information sharing, and coordination of collective action.33

Yet how, precisely, do these social network connections and interactions facilitate individual and organizational learning? In general, Kenney argues that
terrorists learn by acquiring information about various
methods (including by gaining firsthand experience
employing them), sharing knowledge about different
operational and technical methods with other trusted
persons through varying types of social interaction,
and then applying that knowledge and experience
when planning and carrying out future operations.34
More specifically, they do so by means of ongoing
interactions within the social networks they belong
to, by forming “communities of practice,” and—to a
lesser extent—by consulting the Internet to obtain information. As noted above, communities of practice
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are formed when experienced veterans begin, more
or less systematically, interacting with and providing instruction to novices. After receiving a certain
amount of training, the latter then increasingly refine
their “knowledge in practice” as they continue to apply the lessons they have learned (assuming that they
live to fight another day). In so doing, those who were
once novices eventually develop sufficient expertise
themselves to become “full-fledged practitioners” in
that community of practice.35 Again, it is within these
terrorist communities of practice that the difficult-tocodify and -master skills associated with mētis are normally passed on, either directly or indirectly, to less
experienced members of particular organizations and
cells.
This does not necessarily mean, of course, that
jihadist terrorists are always or even normally good
at learning, either on the individual or the organizational level. Indeed, one of Kenney’s most interesting
research findings was that members of the jihadist
cells whose activities he examined had often failed to
master basic tradecraft skills, both in regard to technical and operational matters, and that consequently
they frequently made serious errors when planning
and carrying out their attacks.36 There were many reasons for this, including the general problems posed
by “incomplete information, bounded rationality, inaccurate and biased references, [and] organizational
inertia,” as well as by problems intrinsic to the jihadist milieu (and, for that matter, certain other extremist milieus), above all ideological fanaticism and religious fatalism.37 As a result, individual members and
entire jihadist cells often ended up learning the wrong
lessons or adopting inferior practices.38 Kenney’s findings, which will be echoed and further reinforced in
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the course of this monograph, should serve as a useful
corrective to the claims of a host of security officials,
policymakers, and scholars—many with a vested professional interest in exaggerating the jihadist threat39—
who have long tended to ascribe hyper-rationality,
overly coherent strategic thinking, and preternatural
levels of operational efficiency to al-Qa‘ida and other
jihadist terrorist groups.
What is the relevance of all this, especially to the
problem of IED fabrication? There is currently an ongoing debate among both scholars and security professionals concerning the degree of difficulty that is
purportedly involved in the planning and carrying
out of terrorist attacks. Although most experts agree
that manufacturing complex explosive devices and
launching more sophisticated attacks both require
greater preparation and impose higher intrinsic “information costs,” some have argued that those same
costs for plotting and committing simpler terrorist attacks are relatively low, especially in connection with
actions like simple shootings and crude bombings.40
Others, however, argue that even the successful perpetration of more rudimentary terrorist attacks requires
the prior acquisition of a significant amount of mētis,
a fact that is generally not acknowledged by those
emphasizing the low information costs of terrorism.41
According to Kenney, mētis—almost by definition—
“imposes substantial information costs on practitioners.”42 After all, even shooting firearms accurately requires a considerable period of prior practice at some
sort of firing range—it is not something that can be
mastered simply by following written instructions. It
follows, then, that carrying out more complicated actions and operations requires even more mētis, which
in return requires more sustained and/or intensive
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practice, since developing a real knack for something
requires “learning-by-doing.”43
This is why information about building explosive
devices found on the Internet, which is in the form of
techne, cannot normally substitute for the acquisition
of mētis, which normally involves obtaining handson bomb-making training from experts, followed by
frequent practicing of the lessons learned. Even so,
the fabrication of sophisticated and destructive IEDs
typically requires a combination of techne and mētis, as
Kenney explains:
Abstract technical knowledge, as found in codified
bomb-making recipes, is essential because it contains
precise measurements for combining different, often
volatile chemicals in precise ways to produce the desired compounds. To be useful, this technical knowledge must be clearly expressed in coherent, step-bystep instructions that readers can follow. However,
even when bomb-making recipes are accurate and
reliable, which often times they are not, applying this
abstract knowledge to meet local needs and circumstances requires practice, the act of assembling bombs
from different artifacts with one’s own hands, repeatedly. With practice, bomb-makers develop the ability
to combine abstract know-what with experimental
know-how. This intuitive blending of the abstract
with the concrete forms the cornerstone of real world
expertise. In this sense, terrorist techne and terrorist
mētis are complimentary, not mutually exclusive.44

Although it might not be impossible to construct an
explosive device by carefully following instructions
found on the Internet, it could be very risky to do
so. First, even if the online recipe turns out to be accurate, it can be extremely dangerous to try to mix
chemicals or attach detonators without having prac-
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ticed these activities for a considerable period. Second, it turns out that much of the information found
in online bomb-making manuals is either incomplete
or seriously inaccurate. Indeed, an explosives expert
consulted by Kenney who carefully examined several well-known jihadist online manuals claiming to
incorporate bomb-making expertise found that much
of the information contained therein was “rubbish.”45
Hence terrorists who lack mētis are unlikely to be able
to build sophisticated bombs.
That is why it is so important for would-be jihadists to obtain first-hand advice or training from veteran terrorists and professional criminals who are
trusted members of their social networks before actually planning attacks, fabricating explosive devices, or
attacking selected targets. As Kenney notes:
Veterans facilitate involvement in terrorism by teaching novices [ideological] concepts and values that
support political violence, behavioral norms on how
to treat fellow militants and outsiders, and tactical
know-how for conducting attacks, including how to
case targets, build bombs, lay landmines, safeguard
operational security, and handle different types of
firearms.46

Indeed, experienced militants who had previously received hands-on training overseas and/or
seasoned criminals played a vital role in many of the
plots and attacks that have been launched by jihadists
in Europe.47 Whether informally or formally, veteran
mujahidin tended to mingle with, radicalize, recruit,
indoctrinate, and eventually—with the help of certain predominantly Muslim petty criminals—transmit
technical and operational mētis to select would-be jihadists in various locales, including mosques, prisons,
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Islamic cultural centers, small shops owned by other
“brothers,” personal residences, “garage mosques,”
and at privately-organized study circles, social gatherings, and sporting events.48
In any case, the most important indicators of the
possible existence of IED mētis in this particular context is whether members of various jihadist cells in
Europe had received hands-on training from expert
bomb makers affiliated with larger, more professional, operationally sophisticated terrorist organizations
or, alternatively, whether those cells happened to
include, perhaps serendipitously, experienced bomb
makers within their own ranks. It is these two questions that will be addressed in Part III of this report,
specifically in connection with the devastating March
2004 train bombings in Madrid and the failed July
2006 train bombings near Koblenz and Dortmund.
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PART III:
JIHADIST CELLS IN EUROPE AND
IED EXPERTISE
The purpose of this section is to examine certain
key aspects of two jihadist terrorist plots involving
the utilization of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
in Europe, one that was successfully carried out (the
2004 Madrid train bombings) and one that failed (the
2006 Cologne-area train bombings), in an effort to
clarify two specific issues: One is the extent to which
members of the cells involved in these attacks might
have been linked to battle-hardened jihadists and/or
operationally sophisticated terrorist organizations or
networks elsewhere, from whom they might have obtained some prior hands-on training in bomb making.
The other is whether, in lieu of such connections, any
members of these cells were themselves experienced
bomb makers. The answers to these questions, and the
relevance of those answers to the success or failure of
the attacks, may in turn help to shed light, at least in
a tentative and preliminary fashion, on the following
broader issues: First, is it only cells connected to one
or more professional terrorist organizations that are
likely to be able to carry out (a) devastating single IED
attacks and, by extension, (b) sustained “IED campaigns” marked by a succession of such attacks? Two,
could these types of IED attacks—or even full-fledged
IED campaigns—also be carried out by fully autonomous “self-starter” cells, i.e., cells whose members are
inspired by the globally-oriented “jihadist Salafist”
ideology espoused by Qa‘idat al-Jihad but who are
not organizationally or logistically linked in a tangible
way to other jihadist networks? Needless to say, the

30

answer to these questions in the European context has
significant security implications with respect to IED
use and effectiveness for the United States homeland
as well.
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
Before turning to the two case studies, however, it
is necessary to provide some preliminary information
on the different facets of the jihadist threat in Europe,
the phases of foreign jihadist implantation in Europe,
and the different types of jihadist cells operating there.
On the first of these matters, Lorenzo Vidino has justly
highlighted the highly variegated nature of the jihadist threat in Europe by drawing a useful distinction
between three separate dimensions of that threat.
First, there is the “imported” jihadist threat, i.e., that
posed by more or less veteran jihadists from Muslim
countries who manage to obtain political asylum or
guest worker status in European countries but then
continue pursuing their extremist aims. Second, there
is the “home-brewed” jihadist threat, i.e., that posed
by second- and third-generation European Muslims,
usually the descendants of foreign immigrant workers, who have become so alienated from and hostile
towards their Western homelands that they come to
embrace radical forms of Islam and eventually opt to
engage in armed jihad. Finally, there is the “homegrown” jihadist threat, i.e., that posed by a small
number of European converts to Islam who likewise,
as is often the case with “born again” converts, end
up embracing extremist doctrines and then go on to
join jihadist cells.49 However valuable these distinctions are, especially in connection with efforts to create a demographic profile of European jihadists, what
is most relevant in the context of this monograph is
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(1) whether local jihadist cells in Europe were linked
organizationally or logistically to veteran jihadist networks in North Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia,
and (2) whether any members of those cells, be they
imported, home-brewed, or home-grown, had previously received hands-on training in bomb-making
from professionals. In short, the question is whether
certain members of specific European jihadist cells
had managed to develop sufficient levels of mētis with
respect to IED fabrication.
On the subject of jihadist implantation, one can
identify several successive phases.50 In the first phase,
from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, a number of
jihadists had flocked to Western Europe in order to
obtain political asylum or refugee status and thereby
escape persecution at home. Most of these men were
either wanted in their own countries for terrorism-related offenses or had not been allowed to return home
after fighting in Afghanistan or on other far-flung jihadist fronts, and were thus forced to go elsewhere to
establish a new life.51 For example, many members of
the Syrian branch of the Jami‘yyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Society of the Muslim Brothers, better known
as the Muslim Brotherhood), an organization which
had been brutally suppressed in their Ba’athist-ruled
homeland, found refuge in the 1980s in Europe.52 Although many lay low for a time and focused on rebuilding their personal lives, some soon resurfaced
and became actively involved in Islamist activities,
including recruiting fighters to go to Bosnia, where
during the 1990s Muslims were being subjected to
military attacks and reciprocal campaigns of “ethnic
cleansing” by Croats and Serbs. Illustrative of such a
trajectory was the career of Mustafa Sitt Maryam Nasar (better known as Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri), a very im-
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portant jihadist thinker, operator, and military theorist who resided in several European countries while
supporting transnational jihadist activities.53
In the second phase, during the mid-1990s, individual jihadists not only began going to Europe to obtain asylum for themselves, but also specifically to establish external support or “rearguard” networks for
the terrorist organizations fighting in their home countries, those operating on other jihadist fronts, or for
al-Qa‘ida.54 Among the many foreign terrorist groups
that such individuals managed to set up support networks for in Europe were al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group [IG]) and the Tanzim al-Jihad al-Islami
(Islamic Jihad Organization[EIJ]) in Egypt; al-Jama‘a
al-Islamiyya al-Musallaha/Groupe Islamique Armé
(Armed Islamic Group [GIA]), the Jaysh al-Islami lial-Inqadh/Armée Islamique de Salut (AIS: Islamic
Salvation Army), and later the Jama‘at al-Salafiyya lial-Da‘wa wa al-Qital/Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (Salafist Group for Preaching and
Fighting [GSPC]) in Algeria; the Jabha al-Islamiyya
al-Tunisiyya/Front Islamique Tunisien (Tunisian Islamic Front [FIT]), purportedly the military wing of
Rashid al-Ghannushi’s Hizb al-Nahda (Renaissance
Party); the Lajnat al-Difa‘ ‘an al-Huquq al-Shar‘iyya
(Committee for the Defense of Legitimate [ i.e.,
shari‘a-based] Rights [CDLR]) in Saudi Arabia; and
the Jama‘at al-Islamiyya al-Mujahida bi al-Maghrib/
Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (Moroccan
Islamic Fighting Group [GICM]).55 Support networks
were also created in Western Europe for diverse Bosnian and Chechen jihadist components, and several
of the European mujahidin who went to fight on those
fronts later returned home to promote and wage jihad
after having received hands-on training and gaining
combat experience.56
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In the third phase, which began in the latter half
of the 1990s and generally continued into the early
years of the third millennium, various jihadists began arriving in Europe specifically in order to use the
continent as a staging area for planning and carrying out terrorist attacks, either on particular “infidel”
Western countries or on Muslim countries ruled by
“apostates.” To put it another way, there was a shift
in jihadist activity inside Europe from a primarily logistical to an increasingly operational role. Many of
the individuals involved in this new wave of terrorist
operations had previously received hands-on training at al-Qa‘ida camps in Afghanistan or at jihadist
training camps established in Pakistan, Chechnya, or
the Pankisi Gorge region of Georgia.57 Moreover, most
of the plots and attacks they participated in had been
secretly instigated or sponsored—and in some cases
even devised—by key operational leaders of jihadist
groups abroad, including members of al-Qa‘ida’s majlis al-shura, even though these foreign plotters generally left the actual operational details to the designated
‘umara (plural of ‘amir, i.e., commander or prince) of
local Europe-based cells. The most important of the
externally sponsored attacks that were in part planned
and launched by jihadists residing in Europe was the
so-called “planes operation” on “blessed Tuesday”
(i.e., September 11, 2001 [9/11]),58 but there were also
many other such actions.59
In the fourth and final phase, which became more
and more pronounced in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the resulting destruction of
al-Qa‘ida’s Afghan training camp complexes, jihadists in Europe have increasingly resorted to planning
and carrying out attacks against the very countries in
which they themselves are resident. Indeed, it was in
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this most recent and still current phase that most of
the major terrorist plots and attacks against European
countries were launched, including the devastating
March 11, 2004, bombings in Madrid and the July 7,
2005, bombings in London.60 According to some analysts, during this phase there was a shift away from
attacks inside Europe that had been sponsored and
supported by veteran jihadist groups abroad and towards attacks that were instead planned and carried
out by local, fully autonomous cells composed of disgruntled European Muslim citizens or residents who
had found a new identity and circle of friends by embracing the “jihadist Salafist” ideology espoused by
globally-oriented terrorist networks like al-Qa‘ida.61
In its most extreme formulation, such cells allegedly
consisted of amateurish “bunches of guys” who became radicalized, often together in small groups rather than individually, but had no significant logistical
or operational linkages to more professional terrorist
organizations based outside of Europe. Although in
a handful of cases this overly simplistic characterization might be true, in general the actual situation on
the ground concerning these cells has been far more
complex and murky than such a portrayal indicates,
a point that will become clearer in the analysis of the
Madrid bombings below.
This debate about the current nature of jihadist
cells, both in Europe and elsewhere, has now assumed
both a greater degree of salience and a somewhat nasty
personal dimension due to the high-profile public dispute between Bruce Hoffman and Marc Sageman. In
response to the publication of Sageman’s most recent
book, Leaderless Jihad, which characterizes contemporary jihadist terrorism as primarily a “bottom up”
phenomenon, i.e., one in which small local cells are
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formed by radicalized amateurs on their own initiative, without receiving any direction or tangible support from al-Qa‘ida central or other affiliated jihadist
terrorist organizations, Hoffman wrote a scathing
book review in Foreign Affairs.62 In addition to complaining about Sageman’s arrogant dismissal of other
terrorism scholarship as well as his displays of historical ignorance and supposedly scientific methodological pretensions, Hoffman argued that al-Qa‘ida Central was still a powerful and dangerous organization
which not only exerted an inspirational ideological
impact, but also still played a significant leadership
and operational role in relation to jihadist cells operating in the West.63 Hence, while not denying that certain localized cells may have formed spontaneously
and remained fully autonomous, he rightly emphasized that jihadist terrorism still had a significant “top
down” dimension. Similar conclusions had also been
reached, both by other scholars and by high-ranking
intelligence officials.64 In his rebuttals in the subsequent issue of Foreign Affairs and elsewhere, Sageman
insisted that he recognized that the danger posed by
al-Qa‘ida Central was still substantial, accused Hoffman of mischaracterizing his argument and creating a
straw man, and then proceeded to make his own personal attacks.65
To some extent this entire back-and-forth polemic has been misleading. First of all, both Sageman and Hoffman recognize that some jihadist terrorist schemes in Europe are effectively “top-down”
plots sponsored by al-Qa‘ida or other foreign jihadist
groups, whereas others are “bottom-up” plots initiated by local, relatively autonomous cells. Hence their
real dispute is largely a product of different emphases
rather than outright disagreement. As William Mc-
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Cants of West Point’s Combatting Terrorism Center
justly puts it, the “main difference [between them] is
over how strong AQ Central is and what relationship
it has to those who fight in its name.”66 Second, as noted above, many actual plots have involved a complex
combination of top-down and bottom-up features,
and in that sense they do not fall squarely into either
of these two ostensibly discrete categories.67 Indeed, in
many (if not most) instances, it might be more fruitful
to combine these approaches in “ways which provide
complementary insights and a deeper level of understanding” instead of articulating them in mutually
exclusive forms that “leave little common ground between them.”68 Alas, part of the problem, conceptually
speaking, is that the two high-profile analysts and their
respective supporters have at times tended to confuse
and conflate what are in fact several different types of
interactions and interrelationships that have existed
between local cells and foreign jihadist organizations.
Hence the first desideratum is to distinguish clearly
between diverse types of interactions, even though in
the real world the situation is typically fluid, dynamic,
and therefore messy.
Before actually turning to this question, it is necessary to provide some background information about
the basic structure of Qa‘idat al-Jihad, the most important of the foreign jihadist organizations that are
strongly motivated to carry out terrorist attacks on
Western soil. Al-Qa‘ida proper is a relatively small
organization, numerically speaking, which is divided
into two basic levels.69 First, there are a few dozen
members in the so-called majlis al-shura, which is internally subdivided into several functionally specialized committees, one of which is concerned explicitly
with military affairs.70 This council effectively con-
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stitutes the strategic directorate or officer corps of
the group. Second, al-Qa‘ida consists of somewhere
between several hundred and several thousand rankand-file members who take their marching orders
directly from leading figures of the majlis al-shura or
their subordinates.71 These members of the rank-andfile are in turn subdivided into smaller groups known
as anqud (literally “clusters [of grapes]”), often on a
geographic basis that has led, in practice, to clustering
on the basis of ethnicity or nationality.72 That is essentially all there is to al-Qa‘ida as an actual organization.
If the group’s leaders wish to organize an attack themselves, they generally either employ existing members
of al-Qa‘ida’s rank-and-file or recruit suitable volunteers from elsewhere who have already received—or
may be currently receiving—training from those rankand-file members in the group’s camps. Alternatively,
they may elect to send operatives abroad to radicalize
and recruit locals, who then go on to carry out attacks.
Strictly speaking, if one was limiting one’s analysis to
al-Qa‘ida Central as an organization, it would only
be necessary to consider the actions carried out by its
rank-and-file members or those seemingly promising
individuals who its leaders had recruited specifically
to carry out particular actions, wherever in the world
they might be operating.
Unfortunately, there is much more to the Islamist
terrorist threat than is represented by the leaders and
rank-and-file members of al-Qa‘ida’s central organization, which is now apparently based somewhere
in the Pakistani tribal frontier zone. The issues under
consideration here are in fact complicated enormously
by two developments. First, al-Qa‘ida has established
organizational, operational, or logistical affiliations
with a host of other Islamist terrorist organizations or
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factions thereof, both within and outside the Middle
East. These affiliated groups and factions have more
or less publicly embraced al-Qa‘ida’s transnational
jihadist agenda, including its emphasis on attacking
the “far enemy,” i.e., the United States and its Western allies. Some of these affiliated organizations have
now become quasi-official local branches of al-Qa‘ida
Central, including the Tanzim Qa‘idat al-Jihad fi Bilad
al-Rafidayn (al-Qa‘ida Organization in Mesopotamia),
the Tanzim Qa‘idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Haramayn (alQa‘ida Organization in the Land of the Two Holy Places, i.e., the Arabian peninsula), and the Tanzim Qa‘idat
al-Jihad fi al-Maghrib al-Islami (al-Qa‘ida Organization in the Islamic Maghreb), even though they often
comprise elements from formerly independent jihadist groups (e.g., in the latter case, the GSPC, the GICM,
and similar groups in Tunisia and Libya), whereas
others still remain independent groups even though
they have adopted the same global jihadist ideology.
At the same time, these groups have not entirely abandoned their former local, national, or regional concerns
and objectives, much less armed struggles against the
“near enemy” in their respective areas. There is no
doubt, for example, that self-proclaimed supporters of
a global jihad such as factions of Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Association [JI]) in Indonesia, the Jaysh AdanAbyan al-Islami (Aden-Abyan Islamic Army [AAIA])
in Yemen, Lashkar-i Tayyiba and Jaysh-i Muhammad
(Army of Muhammad) in Pakistan, the Juma‘a Abu
Sayyaf (Bearer of Swords Group) in the Philippines,
the Fath al-Islam (Conquest of Islam) group in Lebanese refugee camps, and the jihadist “combat jama‘ats”
in the Caucasus are still interested in eventually overthrowing the “infidel” regimes in their own areas or
countries, at times even more so than in engaging in
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global jihad. This should not come as a surprise, since
despite his advocacy of a worldwide jihad, Bin Ladin
himself had retained a particular interest in destabilizing the Saudi regime in his own homeland, the “Land
of the Two Holy Places,” and Ayman al-Zawahiri still
remains embroiled in Egyptian Islamist infighting despite having left Egypt and opted to merge his own
“internationalist” faction of the Tanzim al-Jihad into
the al-Qa‘ida organization.73
Second, as many analysts have argued, in recent
years al-Qa‘ida has transmogrified from an actual,
relatively delimited organization into the organizational expression of a diffuse ideological current that
nowadays serves to inspire hundreds of thousands, if
not millions, of people across the Muslim world.74 Although only a small segment of this radicalized population may end up having recourse to terrorism, the
result is an ever-growing increase in the threat posed
by alleged “self-starter” groups inspired by Bin Ladin’s ideology—which some have referred to as “Bin
Ladinism”—but that seem at first glance to have few
if any tangible organizational, operational, or logistical connections to al-Qa‘ida itself. For example, some
have argued that the July 7, 2005, London bombings
were carried out mainly by small self-starter cells
composed of disaffected Muslim citizens or permanent residents who, inspired to respond by the exhortations of al-Qa‘ida and other jihadist spokesmen,
endeavored to carry out devastating acts of violence
against “infidel” Westerners at home.75 Note that Bin
Ladin had always claimed, sometimes disingenuously
in an effort to conceal the actual operational involvement of al-Qa‘ida, that his primary role was to function as an instigator rather than an actual organizer
of jihadist actions.76 On the other hand, documentary
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materials recovered from Bin Ladin’s hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, by the U.S. Navy’s Seal Team Six
indicate that he was still involved in planning terrorist
operations up until his death, and al-Qa‘ida Central
has reportedly exerted an ever-increasing impact, direct and indirect, on both the ideological and operational characteristics of various Afghan and Pakistani
jihadist groups.77
However that may be, three European terrorism
analysts made an effort in 2007 to distinguish conceptually between three different types of jihadist terrorist
operations in Europe. In an article in Studies in Conflict
and Terrorism, Javier Jordán, Fernando M. Mañas, and
Nicola Horsburgh differentiate between what they
refer to as: 1) hit squads, members of foreign Global
Jihad Movement (GJMV) terrorist organizations—like
al-Qa‘ida, the GSPC, the GICM, or the Jama‘at alTawhid wa al-Jihad (Unity of God and Jihad Group)
network established by Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi prior
to his June 2006 death in Iraq—who enter Europe from
abroad in order to carry out attacks; 2) local cells belonging to al-Qa‘ida or other foreign terrorist groups
which are “autonomous at [the] tactical level” but part
of a wider hierarchical organization at [the] strategic
and operational levels”; and 3) grassroots jihadist networks (GJN), groups of individuals who “accept the
strategic objectives of the Global Jihad Movement and
attempt to contribute to these from their country of
residence” but “do not belong formally to the hierarchical structure” of al-Qa‘ida or other GJMV groups.78
Nevertheless, there are arguably problems with this
clear-cut categorization scheme inasmuch as some of
these so-called “grassroots networks” have included
individuals who were actually members of foreign
GJMV groups and might have still been acting at the
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behest of those groups even if they were no longer
in regular contact with or taking direct orders from
them. Under these circumstances, it may be misleading to draw such a sharp separation between supposedly “grassroots networks” and bona fide “local cells”
established in Western countries by foreign organizations. Very often, in fact, it remains unclear exactly
where particular cells fall along this porous and sometimes shifting boundary between Jordán et al.’s second
and third categories.
Indeed, in order to capture the full complexity of
the situation on the ground, it is arguably necessary to
make further refinements to the tripartite scheme delineated above. In that spirit, I propose the following
categorization system, which expands considerably
upon the aforementioned scheme.
1. Jihadist “hit teams” sent from abroad.
• jihadist “hit teams” sent to Europe from
elsewhere by al-Qa‘ida Central, usually after
having been provided with specialized instruction in training camps abroad (perhaps
including bomb-making skills), in order
to launch terrorist operations and attacks
themselves;
• jihadist “hit teams” sent to Europe from elsewhere by al-Qa‘ida’s nominal or de facto regional affiliates, perhaps after obtaining specialized training in their respective countries,
in order to carry out terrorist operations and
attacks themselves;
• jihadist “hit teams” sent to Europe from
elsewhere by other veteran jihadist organizations, perhaps after obtaining specialized
training in their respective countries, in order to carry out terrorist operations and attacks themselves.
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2. “Local” jihadist cells organized, supported, and/or
directed from abroad.
• “local” jihadist cells recruited and trained by
al-Qa‘ida operatives implanted in Europe for
that very purpose, and thereafter receiving
periodic assistance of various types from alQa‘ida Central or its regional affiliates;
• “local” jihadist cells recruited and trained
by operatives sent by other veteran jihadist groups who were implanted in Europe,
sometimes for that very purpose, and thereafter receiving periodic assistance of various
types from their parent organizations.
3. Connected “self-generating” European jihadist cells.
• “self-generating” European jihadist cells that
are in direct contact with operatives from alQa‘ida Central;
• “self-generating” European jihadist cells that
are in direct contact with operatives from alQa‘ida’s regional affiliates;
• “self-generating” European jihadist cells that
are in direct contact with operatives from
other veteran jihadist groups;
• “self-generating” European jihadist cells that
are connected indirectly, via intermediaries,
to operatives from al-Qa‘ida Central, its regional affiliates, or other veteran jihadist
groups;
• “self-generating” European jihadist cells that
are in direct contact with operatives from
other European “self-generating” cells;
• “self-generating” European jihadist cells that
are connected indirectly, via intermediaries,
to operatives from other European “self-generating” cells;
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• “ self-generating” European jihadist cells that
include individuals who are members of alQa‘ida or other foreign terrorist networks.
4. Isolated or fully autonomous “self-generating” European jihadist cells that are not connected in any way to
members of any other jihadist groups or cells.
This particular system, though perhaps overly
elaborate, does permit subtler and more important
distinctions to be made than the simpler tripartite
scheme proposed by Jordán et al.
Nevertheless, a few additional points need to be
highlighted. First, one of the problems surrounding
the current debate about the nature of jihadist cells
in Europe is that arguments are often framed in such
a way as to suggest that those cells are either linked
to and receiving direction from al-Qa‘ida Central itself or, alternatively, that they are fully autonomous.
However, neither of these contrasting interpretations,
which lie on opposite poles of a much broader spectrum of possible types and levels of interconnectivity
or interaction, are necessarily—or even typically—accurate with respect to the situation of really existing
European cells. It is crucially important to determine,
for example, whether such cells are connected to alQa‘ida Central or instead, say, to other foreign jihadist groups. Second, the categorization system outlined
above is somewhat artificial inasmuch as not all of the
enumerated categories are necessarily discrete, much
less mutually exclusive. For example, some European
cells could conceivably be connected to al-Qa‘ida Central, to its regional affiliates, to other veteran jihadist
organizations, and/or to other self-generating cells in
Europe—factual questions that can only be answered
by carrying out in-depth qualitative research. Indeed,
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it is undeniable that many local jihadist cells in Europe,
whether their members were originally recruited by
foreign operatives or whether they were initially selfgenerating, have in fact been connected, directly or
indirectly, to terrorist groups based elsewhere. Conversely, it has rarely been the case that allegedly isolated self-generating jihadist cells made up entirely of
amateurish “bunches of guys,” a phenomenon whose
importance has surely been exaggerated by Sageman
and his acolytes, have successfully carried out terrorist attacks in the West, including attacks with IEDs.
Hence the key issue is not so much to assess
whether members of these European cells have been
connected in various ways to other jihadist “brothers,” which has normally been the case thus far, but
rather to identify exactly who they were connected
to and, perhaps even more importantly, to determine
precisely how they were connected to them. This is a
task that is often not easy to carry out given the lack
of detailed information that is presently in the public domain about particular jihadist plots.79 In such a
complex and potentially confusing context it may thus
be useful, before examining two IED case studies, to
make some general observations about the Social Network Analysis (SNA) of terrorist organizations and
networks, a technique that has recently become very
faddish.
A social network can be defined as a social structure, however diffuse it may be, that is made up of
nodes that are tied to each other by one or more specific types of interdependency.80 Broadly speaking, SNA
involves the “mapping and measuring of relationships and flows between people, groups, [and] organizations.”81 In essence, this mapping and measuring
is based on the tracking of nodes and links (or ties) in
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networks via visual and mathematical analysis. The
key to this process is first determining the “location of
actors in the network” and thence, by using various
measuring techniques, assessing the “centrality” of
the various nodes. There are, however, three different
centrality measures: 1) degree centrality, or the number
of direct connections each node has; 2) between-ness
centrality, or whether nodes are positioned so that
they can play “broker” roles vis-à-vis other nodes and
networks; and 3) closeness centrality, or which nodes
have the shortest paths to other nodes. On the basis of
previous SNA analyses, it is now generally believed
that shorter network paths are most important, since
beyond a certain spatial distance particular nodes can
no longer influence each other; that so-called “boundary spanners” on the between-ness centrality scale
are more important to the overall network due to the
bridging roles they can play; and that apparently peripheral nodes that are connected to other, as yet little
known networks, may also be of great importance. In
any case, according to the proponents of SNA, this approach can yield a great deal of information about the
overall network structure by providing more “insight
into the various roles and groupings in a network—
who are the connectors, mavens, leaders, bridges,
[and] isolates, where are the clusters and who is in
them, who is in the core of the network, and who is
on the periphery?”82 Who could disagree, at least in
theory?
Alas, just as the proponents of numerous other
fashionable and not-so-fashionable theories and methodologies have flooded the terrorism field in the wake
of 9/11, both in order to appear more relevant and to
obtain access to enlarged counterterrorism funding
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streams, so too have the practitioners of SNA. As a
result, there is an ever-growing stream of studies of
diverse terrorist networks based on the application of
SNA.83 Given this mad rush to be on the supposed cutting edge of methodological trends, however, some
cautionary notes need to be sounded.
First, no methodological technique, no matter how
useful, can substitute for subject matter expertise developed over the course of years of study. One of the
things that never ceases to amaze serious scholars
who have spent years or even decades doing in-depth
qualitative research on extremist and terrorist groups
is the abysmal ignorance of those subjects displayed
by so many self-styled social science “experts,” who
tend to be fixated on promoting their pet models and
theories or who view certain favored methodologies
as some sort of “magic bullet” that can allegedly explain and thereby help to resolve every social problem,
not to mention predict future human behavior. These
presumptions and claims are largely illusory. Despite
the immense progress we have made in understanding the material world by applying (natural) scientific
methodologies, the complex drivers of human behavior still remain opaque and even, in many fundamental respects, mysterious.84 Here we are dealing with a
fundamental methodological divide within the “social
sciences” or, to be more precise, between the “social
sciences” and the “humanities.” The primary division
is between the “social scientists,” those who believe
that human behavior can best be investigated using
the same techniques and methods that are employed
in the natural or physical sciences, above all quantitative methods, and the “humanities scholars,” those
who believe that these natural science methods are often inherently unsuited to studying and understand-
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ing far more intangible but vitally important aspects
of human behavior. These are complex philosophical
and methodological issues that cannot be elaborated
upon further in this context, but it is important to emphasize that not every scholar or terrorism researcher
agrees that the best way to understand social phenomena and human behavior is to adopt the current social science emphasis on theory-and model-building,
hypothesis testing, and quantification. Indeed, the
two contrasting groups identified above even employ
terms like “empirical” in radically different ways.
Second, the single-minded emphasis on determining the location and centrality of nodes and links in
a given network can be very misleading, since many
nodes and links that appear to be “central” from a spatial perspective may in fact play a minor functional
role in the network. For example, some nodes that initially appear to be important network “hubs” may not
turn out to be important at all. Suppose one was doing
a “traffic analysis” of communications between purported members of a terrorist group, and one individual appeared to be making and receiving an unusual
number of calls every Wednesday night. Without actually monitoring the contents of those phone conversations, there would be no way of knowing whether
that individual was performing a vital function such
as providing operational instructions to cell members,
or whether he was the designated “food man” who
was entrusted with calling several “brothers” to find
out what they wanted to eat that evening before contacting a restaurant and placing their orders. Indeed,
it is not so much the location of such network nodes
but rather the functions that they actually perform for the
network that are of decisive importance. In the context of terrorist networks, then, one should not con-
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fuse apparent network “centrality” with operational
significance.
Third, the only way to collect and evaluate the massive quantities of factual information that are needed
to be able to accurately map a social network is to carry out in-depth qualitative research by systematically
consulting a wide array of available primary sources.
Based on the principle of “garbage in, garbage out,”
any SNA mapping or measuring that is based upon
seriously incomplete, inaccurate, or otherwise flawed
sources of information is virtually guaranteed to be
more misleading than illuminating, and thus potentially more harmful than beneficial to those acting on
that information. In that sense, the cavalier display of
complex diagrams with dozens of crisscrossing lines
that purportedly indicate that certain people are linked
in some way to others, absent any attempt to clarify
the precise nature of those visually depicted links, is
all too often confusing rather than enlightening. The
hip bone may indeed be connected to the thigh bone,
but what function does it actually perform within the
skeletal system?
THE 3/11 MADRID TRAIN BOMBINGS
On the morning of March 11, 2004 (3/11), several
members of a jihadist cell entered various train cars
passing through the so-called “corridor of Henares,”
i.e., a portion of the Red Nacional de Ferrocarriles
Españoles (National Network of Spanish Railways
[RENFE]) commuter train system in Madrid situated
between the stations of Atocha-Madrid and Alcalá de
Henares, where—before exiting from the trains—they
deposited backpacks or sports bags filled with a gelatinous nitroglycol-based Spanish-made high explosive
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known as Goma-2 ECO, nails and screws to produce
shrapnel, and industrial electric detonators connected
by wires to cell phones. Between 7:37 and 7:40 a.m.,
someone then detonated 10 of the 13 devices they had
left on the trains by means of cell phone signals, killing 191 people and injuring another 1,824, many of
them very seriously.
The grim details are as follows.85 Four bombs were
placed on Train 21431, which had stopped to let passengers in and out at the Atocha station: The first
exploded on car six at 7:37, the second on car five at
7:38, and the third on car four only 4 seconds later.
The bomb in car one fortunately failed to explode and
was found later; a squad from the Unidad de Técnicos
en Desactivación de Explosivas (Technicians’ Unit for
Deactivating Explosives [TEDAX]), the bomb disposal
specialists from the Cuerpo Nacional de Policía (National Police Corps [CNP]) and the Guardia Civil (Civil Guard [GC]) paramilitary police, then attempted to
deactivate it, but it was instead destroyed in a controlled explosion at 9:59 a.m. Four bombs were also
placed on Train 21435, which was just leaving the El
Pozo del Tío Raimundo station. Two exploded on the
upper levels of cars four and five at 7:38, but two others
that had been deposited in the lower levels of cars two
and three were later found intact. One was detonated
on the station platform some time after 9 a.m. that
same day in a controlled fashion by TEDAX, whereas
the other was inadvertently brought to the police station in the Puente de Vallecas district, where it was
discovered the following day and then dismantled in
Azorín de Vallecas Park. Meanwhile, one bomb was
placed in car four of Train 21713, which was stopped
at the Santa Eugenia station, where it too exploded at
7:38. Finally, four bombs were placed on Train 17305,
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which was then 800 meters from the Atocha station
parallel to the Calle Téllez rail line. These bombs (like
those on Train 21431) had also been placed in cars one,
four, five, and six, and all four exploded at 7:39.
Fortunately, the members of the terrorist cell had
made numerous errors in tradecraft that enabled the
Spanish police to track them down quickly. For example, three of the bombers had entered the train station
at Alcalá de Henares after parking a white Renault
Kangoo van in a parking lot on Calle Infantado de
Alcalá. An alert doorman named Luis Garrudo who
had spotted them called the police after learning of the
bombings, and following a cautious but brief on-site
investigation the responding officers from Madrid’s
Brigada Provincial de Información (Provincial Intelligence Brigade [BPI], i.e., anti-terrorism specialists)
and the Policía Científica (Forensic Police, i.e., technical specialists) from the Alcalá de Henares police station impounded the van. After a decision was made
to transport it to the police station in the Canillas district at 3:30 p.m., the forensic police discovered crucial
clues inside the abandoned vehicle, which was owned
by José Garzón Gómez but had been stolen in front of
his house on Calle Aranjuez on the evening of February 27-28. Among other items, they found seven unused detonators manufactured by the Union Esplosivos Ensign Bickford in a blue plastic trash bag under
the passenger seat (similar to those found in the unexploded bombs and various sites linked to the bombers86), DNA evidence linking several cell members to
the vehicle, and a cassette tape with Arabic-language
inscriptions in the glove compartment containing recordings of passages from sura 3 (al-‘Imran: The Family of Amran) of the Qur’an that justified the killing of
“infidels.”87
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However, the bomb found intact in a blue sports
bag that had been dismantled in Azorín Park was the
single most important of the clues left behind by the
perpetrators, since it provided the police with vital
forensic details concerning the bombs. That particular device consisted of just over 10 kilograms (kg) of a
white, jelly-like explosive (Goma-2 ECO), 640 screws
and nails, one detonator marked “made in Spain,”
copper wires connected to a Mitsubishi Trium T-110
mobile phone, and an MA-0501 cell phone charger.88
Perhaps more importantly, the Amena SIM card in the
mobile phone was soon traced to a batch of 30 sold on
February 25, 2008, by Sindhu Enterprise to Jawal Mundo Telecom, located at the Siglo Nuevo shop at Calle
Tribulete 17 in the Lavapiés neighborhood, which was
owned by the Moroccan Jamal Zugham, one of the key
terrorist cell members. It was then determined that 17
of these 30 SIM cards were later activated: 14 of them
were used by members of the cell or their associates
to make calls, whereas seven were thereafter inserted
into 7 Trium T-110 mobile phones, 10 of which had
been purchased in early March from the Bazar Top
store in Avenida Real de Pinto 42.89 Those seven SIM
cards were turned on the night before the bombings in
a small makeshift house in Chinchón on the outskirts
of Madrid—where the explosive devices had actually
been fabricated—and then utilized on March 11 to receive signals to detonate the bombs.90 By tracing the
seller, buyer, and users of this batch of SIM cards and
the phones they were placed in, the police were soon
able to attribute the bombings definitively to Islamists,
abandon the unlikely Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Basque
Fatherland and Freedom [ETA]) trail that was then
being publicly promoted by the conservative Partido
Popular (People’s Party [PP]) government, and rapidly identify several of the actual terrorists.
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The Islamist provenance of the bombings was
soon after “officially” confirmed, when at 7:38 p.m. on
March 13, a call was made by a man speaking Spanish with an Arabic accent to the Telemadrid TV channel, which informed them that a video cassette tape
had been deposited in a trash container near the M-30
mosque, one of the largest Islamic mosques in Europe
(and, not coincidentally, the locale where Imad alDin Barakat Yarkas and his associates had previously
recruited several worshippers into the al-Qa‘ida network in Spain, together with several other individuals
who were thence sent to wage jihad on various foreign
fronts). When the Panasonic mini-video tape was retrieved from the trash container, wrapped in a blue
silk glove and marked “very important” by hand, it
turned out to be a video claiming responsibility for
the 3/11 attacks.91 On the video was a man dressed in
white with his face covered, wearing a hat, and carrying a machine pistol, standing in front of a green
banner with an Arabic inscription of the shahada (the
profession of Muslim faith, viz., “There is no God but
Allah, and Muhammad is His Prophet”), who identified himself as Abu Dujan[a] al-Afghani, the spokesman for the military wing of Ansar al-Qa‘ida fi Urubba
(The Partisans of al-Qa‘ida in Europe).92 The individual
reading this message was later identified as a Moroccan born in Tetuan named Rashid Awlad, who then
read out a message in classical Arabic claiming that
the bombings were carried out in response to Spain’s
participation in the war being waged against Islam
by “international terrorist organizations” headed by
U.S. President George W. Bush and his followers,
and warned that more bloody attacks were to come
unless Spain ceased its “killings” of and “injustices”
against Muslims. He reiterated the standard jihadist
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rhetoric to the effect that the mujahidin would keep
fighting until they achieved victory or martyrdom
because they loved death more than the nonbelievers
loved life, and concluded by reading a verse from the
Qur’an.93 This video was followed up by two more jihadist claims of responsibility, one from the Kata’ib
Abu Hafs al-Masri (Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades) that
was faxed to al-Hayat and emailed to al-Quds al-‘Arabi,
two London-based Arab newspapers, on March 15,
and another that was faxed on April 3 at 6:05 p.m.
to the Spanish newsweekly ABC and signed by Abu
Dujan al-Afghani on behalf of the so-called Death Brigade (Brigada de la Muerte, probably Katiba al-Qatl in
Arabic) of Ansar al-Qa‘ida in Europe, which reiterated
his previous threats.94
In any case, it turned out that Zugham himself was
already well known to investigators from both the
Unidad Central de Información Exterior (Central Unit
for Foreign Intelligence [UCIE]) and the Centro Superior de Información de la Defensa (Higher Center for
Defense Intelligence [CESID]), two security services
that had been closely monitoring Islamist activists in
Spain since 1995.95 Not only was he a member of Imad
al-Din Barakat Yarkas’ al-Qa‘ida network in Spain,
one of the largest and most important in Europe, he
was also a personal friend and confidant of Barakat
Yarkas (better known as Abu Dahdah). Indeed, in response to a request from French anti-terrorist magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguière in the summer of 2001, the
police had surreptitiously entered Zugham’s flat and
found important material related to jihadist activities.
Later on, his name surfaced in connection with the
investigation of the May 16, 2003, bombings in Casablanca, five suicide attacks carried out by jihadists
linked to the GICM. Moreover, both real and would-
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be jihadists had used his Siglo Nuevo store on a regular basis to make calls home to Morocco or to other
countries, and he had long been intimately associated
with a close-knit network of jihadist sympathizers in
Lavapiés. Once his name surfaced in connection with
the SIM card purchases, Zugham and two employees
in his shop were quickly arrested in the late afternoon
on March 13, only 2 days after the attacks.96
On March 16, another key trail was uncovered.97
After tracing more of the calls made from the mobile
phones with the SIM cards and their locations at the
time, agents from the Unidad Central de Apoyo Operativo (Central Operational Support Unit [UCAO])
who were working at the behest of the UCIE determined that a March 4 call had been made by a cell
member from a phone booth in Avilés to the home of
Carmen María Toro Castro, the wife of a 27-year-old
former miner named José Emilio Suárez Trashorras.
Suárez Trashorras was a petty criminal who, after
having been arrested for possession of drugs, Goma-2
explosives, and 94 detonators in “Operación Pipol,”
had been recruited in July 2001 as a confidential informant by Manuel García Rodríguez (nicknamed
Manolón), a police officer who had previously worked
for an anti-terrorist unit but had then become head of
the Brigada de Estupefacientes (Illicit Drug Squad)
in the Avilés police station. Over the years Suárez
Trashorras had then provided certain inside information that had led to the arrest of other petty criminals
for drug trafficking. Indeed, right after the 3/11 attacks, Suárez Trashorras told Manolón that it had
been the “Moors,” not ETA, who were responsible.
This was confirmed after a March 17 phone conversation between Rafa Zuhayr, a Moroccan petty criminal
and confidential informant of the GC, and a member
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of the GC’s Unidad Central Operativa (Central Operational Unit [UCO]) named Víctor—a conversation
monitored by the Madrid anti-drug police—revealed
vital details about a key individual involved in the
3/11 attacks, Jamal Ahmidan (nicknamed “El Chino,”
i.e., “the Chinaman”).98 This small lead eventually enabled the police to reconstruct the activities of a group
of radicalized Moroccan criminals who obtained the
explosive materials and detonators from some Spanish counterparts in Asturias in exchange for drugs and
then arranged for them to be transported to the house
in Chinchón, where the members of the operational
cell used them to fabricate the bombs.
On March 22, officers from the UCAO finally located that small house in Chinchón, which was situated not far from Alcalá de Henares, at kilometer 14
on Road 313, which links Morata de Tajuña and Titulcia.99 After keeping it under surveillance for 3 days,
the police broke down the door and entered the domicile on March 25, where they found residues of nitroglycol and ammonium nitrate, two components of
dynamite; materials from detonators; 105 cartridges;
DNA traces from several cell members; and other important forensic evidence.100 It turned out that Ahmidan had rented the ramshackle property on January
18 under the false name of Yusuf ibn Salah, and that
it had subsequently been used to hold meetings, store
explosives and detonators, and construct the actual
bombs.101 By then, the police had correctly identified
key figures in the two main components of the 3/11
cell, Ahmidan and Zugham, and it was only a matter
of locating and arresting Ahmidan and the other remaining members of the group before they succeeded
in carrying out further bloody attacks. This became all
the more imperative on April 2, when a bomb similar
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to those used in the 3/11 train car attacks was found
alongside the tracks of the Alta Velocidad Española
(AVE: Spanish High Speed) train line between Madrid
and Seville, in the Mocejón zone near Toledo. Apparently, the device had been placed there between 7:20
and 10 a.m. that morning, and contained 12 kilograms
of Goma-2 ECO and an electric detonator attached to a
long-distance 136 meter cable, but no attached battery
or cell that could be used to ignite the detonator.102
Meanwhile, after following several more leads
and arresting a few other cell members, on April 3 the
UCAO tracked several of the key remaining plotters
to a first floor apartment at Calle de Martín Gaite 40
in the Leganés district in southern Madrid. By tracing and monitoring certain mobile phones in which
the SIM cards of interest had been inserted, including
that of Rashid Awlad, they learned that this particular
apartment had been rented on March 8 by a Moroccan
GICM leader named Yusuf ibn al-Hajj. At around 4
p.m., a couple of dozen policemen converged on the
apartment building, and one of them then rang the
bell of the targeted apartment on a bogus pretext in order to determine whether persons with Arab accents
were residing there.103 This brief interchange on the
intercom raised the suspicions of the occupants, who
sent a trained sprinter named ‘Abd al-Majid Abu Shar
downstairs to check out the situation. When Abu Shar
saw the police, he immediately ran off at full speed
but apparently also managed to alert his colleagues
upstairs, one of whom suddenly appeared on the
porch of the apartment and fired machine gun bursts
at a group of policemen below. As a result, between
5:30 and 6:30 p.m. heavily-armed anti-terrorist police from the Grupo Especial de Operaciones (Special
Operations Group [GEO]) arrived on the scene and,
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together with dozens of other policemen and intelligence officers, established a security cordon around
the building as well as a field hospital and listening
posts. From inside the apartment, voices and chanting
in Arabic could be heard, which fueled concerns that
the occupants might suddenly charge out of the apartment with explosive vests on and blow themselves
up. Efforts by the GEO to initiate negotiations commenced around 8 p.m., but in response the terrorists
simply threatened to blow up the building. At 8:30,
several GEO men ascended the stairs, blew open the
door, and fired smoke canisters into the apartment,
but the inhabitants still refused to come out. Instead,
they made several phone calls to loved ones or other
“brothers.” Finally, at 9:03 p.m. the terrorists sat down
in a circle together and detonated a huge explosion,
destroying a substantial part of the building, “martyring” themselves, and killing a GEO officer named
Francisco Javier Torronteras. In the ruins of the apartment, the Forensic Police found much vitally important evidence, including the body parts of seven cell
members, 236 detonators, 30 kilograms of Goma-2
ECO, four machine pistols, jihadist written and audio
materials, plans prepared for the carrying out of future terrorist attacks, and a videotape of three of the
cell members transmitting a belligerent message to the
Spaniards about their motivations and future plans.104
This siege was the most dramatic event that occurred during the actual search for the terrorist
bombers. After the death of most of the material perpetrators at Leganés, the police followed additional
evidentiary trails, examined residences in various locales which the cell members had rented, and arrested
several other individuals who were implicated in the
plot, including the remaining Spanish petty criminals
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in Asturias who had provided the explosive materials and detonators to the jihadists. Meanwhile, the
lengthy judicial investigations and proceedings began
which eventually culminated in the controversial verdict that was issued in 2007.
Links Between 3/11 Cell Members and Other
Jihadist Organizations.
Many knowledgeable observers of the jihadist milieu, above all within Europe, were astounded when
Judge Javier Gómez Bermúdez issued the court’s final verdict concerning the Madrid train bombings on
October 31, 2007. For one thing, many of the defendants got off with very light sentences, to the chagrin
of members of the 11-M Asociación Afectados de
Terrorismo (Association of Persons Affected by 3/11
Terrorism) and most other victims’ associations.105 For
another, the court severely punished various “small
fry,” including some of the petty criminals who had
procured the explosives and detonators, but ended
up dropping the most serious charges against certain
“bigger fish” in the jihadist milieu who were arguably
far more responsible for instigating, encouraging, and
perhaps even helping to plan the operation.106 As noted above, most of the actual bomb placers blew themselves up when the police surrounded their apartment
in Leganés, which prevented them from being arrested
and prosecuted for their crimes. Hence it was incumbent upon the court to uncover and prosecute some of
the instigators and planners behind the attacks, a task
they arguably failed to perform adequately, especially
given the damning information gathered in the course
of the investigation that was reflected in the initial indictment and thence informed the public prosecutor’s
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written statement. Even granting that various peculiarities of the Spanish judicial system may have made
it difficult to prosecute those who were not material
perpetrators or more advisable not to do so in order to
forestall endless appeals, it is difficult to understand
why the attacks were characterized as being “without intellectual authors” or why the serious charges
against key al-Qa‘ida- or GICM-linked figures such as
Rabi‘ ‘Uthman al-Sayyid Ahmad (alias “Muhammad
al-Masri [the Egyptian]”) and ‘Amir al-‘Azizi ended
up being dropped altogether or reduced to lesser
charges.
Long before the final verdict was issued, there had
been an ongoing debate among terrorism analysts concerning the extent to which the 3/11 terrorist cell was
autonomous or, alternatively, whether it was linked
to and operating at the behest of foreign terrorist organizations. Perhaps not surprisingly, attitudes on
this issue were generally influenced by whether those
analysts already viewed al-Qa‘ida primarily as an organization, however networked, horizontal, diffuse,
and “franchised” it might have been, and those who
viewed it essentially as the high-profile vanguard and
self-proclaimed mouthpiece of a much broader “social
movement.” Those in the former camp were more apt
to view the Madrid bombings as an action sponsored
or at least supported in some way by al-Qa‘ida and/
or its affiliates, whereas those in the latter camp were
prone to view the 3/11 cell as a self-generating and
rather amateurish group of friends and kinsmen who,
though inspired by al-Qa‘ida’s global jihadist ideology, undertook violent actions on their own initiative
without any meaningful assistance from al-Qa‘ida
itself or from other professional terrorist organizations.107 Similarly, the former generally viewed the Oc-
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tober 2007 3/11 trial verdict as severely problematic, if
not as a miscarriage of justice, whereas the latter tended to see it as a belated legal confirmation of their own
prior perspective.108 Unfortunately, a good deal of this
debate has missed the point inasmuch as it has grossly
oversimplified, if not inadvertently mischaracterized,
the diverse and complex nature of the links that have
often existed in the past—and are perhaps also likely
to exist in the future—between al-Qa‘ida and local jihadist cells. Before offering further thoughts on this
matter, however, it is necessary to survey the historical development and identify the functional components of the 3/11 cell.
According to the public prosecutor, high-ranking
policemen, attorneys representing the relatives of
the victims, and certain independent journalistic or
academic investigators, the cell responsible for the
Madrid bombings had two main components.109 The
first was the operational group that actually carried
out the bomb attacks, which was composed of Sirhan
ibn ‘Abd al-Majid Fakhit (nicknamed “the Tunisian”),
Zugham, Jamal Ahmidan, Rashid Awlad, his brother
Muhammad Awlad, ‘Abd al-Nabi‘ Kunja‘a, Anwar
Asrih Rifa‘at, and ‘Ali Kamal al-Amari, as well as their
direct helpers, such as Da‘ud Awnani, Abu Shar, and
Muhammad al-Falah.110 The second was the logistical
support group that procured the explosives and detonators used in the attacks as well as providing other
necessary resources and services, such as financing
(derived largely from illicit activities like theft, fraud,
and drug trafficking), false documents, stolen cars, safe
houses, etc. This group consisted of actual jihadist cell
members like Jamal Ahmidan, ‘Uthman al-Ghanawi,
Rashid Akhlif, and ‘Abd al-Ilah al-Fadl al-Akil, as well
as other petty criminals who worked with them but
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were seemingly unaware of the scope and/or details
of the planned attacks, such as Hamid Ahmidan, Nasr
al-Din Abu Sabah, Mahmud Sulayman A‘un, and Rafa
Zuhayr.111 Note that Jamal Ahmidan participated in
both of these types of activities, and was thus a key
liaison man between the operational and logistical
support groups, whereas Zuhayr was the individual
who brought Jamal into contact with the Spanish petty criminals in Asturias who provided the cell with
Goma-2 ECO and industrial detonators that they had
pilfered from a mine. Having identified the principal
culprits, the next desideratum is to discuss the backgrounds of some of these individuals in order to demonstrate that the 3/11 terrorist cell does not conform
to the widely disseminated notion, peddled by Atran
and Sageman, that it was a “self-generating” group of
amateurs without significant connections to al-Qa‘ida
or other jihadist organizations.
Beginning with the operational group members,
the first point that needs to be emphasized is that
the two key personnel in that group—Fakhit and
Zugham—were previously members of Abu Dahdah’s al-Qa‘ida network in Spain.112 So, too, were
eight other individuals who were allegedly involved
in the 3/11 plot. These included a purported mastermind of the attack, the Moroccan Sa‘id ibn al-Arraj;
two men who are believed to have helped inspire
or instigate it, the Moroccans ‘Amir al-‘Azizi (alias
‘Uthman al-Andalusi) and Mustafa al-Maymuni; two
others who participated in meetings along with cell
members where jihad was glorified and/or where
preliminary attack plans were hatched, the Moroccans
Sa‘id al-Shadadi and Idris al-Shabli; and three who
performed certain minor tasks in relation to the renting of the house in Chinchón, the Syrians Muhammad
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Nidal, Walid al-Taraki al-Masri (despite his appellation “the Egyptian”), and Muhammad Badr al-Din
al-Akkad.113 Al-Maymuni and al-‘Azizi were likewise
important figures, respectively, in the Moroccan jihadist groups al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya (Jihadist Salafism)
and the GICM, whose ‘amir Nur al-Din Nafi‘yya had
sworn a personal oath of loyalty (bay‘a) to Bin Ladin
in 1999 and thereafter formed a pact with al-Qa‘ida.114
Even this cursory summary should serve to cast some
doubt on the confident assertions by Atran and Sageman concerning the supposed “self-generating” nature and organizational autonomy of the 3/11 attackers, but as soon as one becomes more familiar with
the extensive activities and contacts of Abu Dahdah’s
earlier network and examines the background of some
of these individuals in more detail, such a portrayal
appears even more untenable.
As mentioned above, the al-Qa‘ida network in
Spain was among the most important components
of the infrastructure that Bin Ladin’s lieutenants had
implanted in the European continent.115 This network
first began to coalesce in the early- to mid-1990s under the leadership of a Palestinian militant named
Anwar Adnan Muhammad Salih (alias Shaykh Salih)
and two former members of the Syrian branch of the
Muslim Brotherhood, Abu Dahdah and—in the initial
stages—Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri.116 In 1994 Abu Dahdah
and Shaykh Salih began actively peddling the radical global jihadist ideas of ‘Umar Mahmud ‘Uthman
(alias Abu Qatada)—who is generally regarded as
al-Qa‘ida’s “spiritual leader” in Europe—at the Abu
Bakr mosque, located in Madrid’s Tetuan neighborhood at Calle Anastasio Herrero 7, in order to spot
and vet suitable worshippers there for induction into
a radical grouping known as the Alianza Islámica (Is-
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lamic Alliance, probably al-Hilf al-Islami in Arabic).
The youngest and most radical members of that group
were thence recruited into an even more militant, secretive, and activist group known as the Soldados de
Alá (Soldiers of Allah, Jund Allah in Arabic), which
thereafter became the core of al-Qa‘ida’s network in
Spain. Several members of the Soldados, along with
other likely candidates, were then recruited and sent
to fight on various jihadist fronts abroad, in particular
Bosnia and Chechnya.
This situation persisted until October 1995 when,
at the orders of al-Qa‘ida’s Saudi logistics chief Zayn
al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn (alias Abu Zubayda),
Shaykh Salih departed for Peshawar to manage the
local office of Bin Ladin’s Maktab al-Khidamat li alMujahidin (MAK: Services Bureau for the Mujahidin),
leaving Abu Dahdah in charge of the Spanish network.
The latter continued his work of recruiting mujahidin
and, with the help of Shaykh Salih and Abu Zubayda,
arranging for their logistical needs, e.g., the provision
of documents, transportation to camps in Afghanistan for training, sustenance, equipping with weapons, and eventual transit to jihadist battlefields where
Muslims were in open conflict with non-Muslims.117
However, a schism developed within the Soldados
when a puritanical fanatic named ‘Abd Allah Khayat
Kattan (alias Abu Ibrahim) joined the group, which
was then engaged in proselytizing at the Centro Islámico de Madrid inside the huge M-30 mosque, and
decided to challenge the leadership of Abu Dahdah.
The bitter infighting between the two factions within
the organization abruptly ended in 1997 when Abu
Ibrahim left Spain and went to Jordan, thereby leaving Abu Dahdah as its sole leader.
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Apart from being actively engaged for years in
indoctrinating and radicalizing alienated Muslims in
Spain, recruiting and training suitable candidates to
go abroad and wage jihad on various fronts, and providing medical care and refuge for returning jihadist
veterans, another noteworthy feature of the Abu Dahdah network was that its key personnel maintained
extensive ongoing interactions with “fraternal” alQa‘ida branches and affiliated jihadist networks, both
in other European countries and abroad.118 Indeed, it
was largely because of this elaborate spider web of personal and organizational connections which they had
nurtured that Abu Dahdah and his lieutenants were
able to perform their vital recruitment and logistical
services for the global jihadist cause. Among the numerous groups that Alianza Islámica personnel regularly interacted with were al-Qa‘ida branches in Britain
(through Abu Qatada, Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, and Khalid
al-Fawaz of the CDLR), Germany (through Ma’mun
Darkazanli and Muhammad Haydar Zammar, two
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood members, and the Moroccan Sa‘id bin al-Hajji, all three of whom were linked to
the 9/11 plotters), and Italy (through Muhammad the
Egyptian), as well as groups such as the Algerian Jabha al-Islamiyya li al-Inqadh/Front Islamique du Salut
(Islamic Salvation Front [FIS]) and GIA; the Jama‘a alMuqatila al-Tunisiyya/Groupe Combattant Tunisien
(Tunisian Fighting Group [GCT]), the military wing
of the FIT (through Tariq Ma‘arufi in Belgium); the
Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-Islam (Partisans of
Islam) through Shaykh Mahar; jihadist organizations
in the Balkans and Chechnya; and many others.
Of most interest to American readers, of course, is
the fact that individuals connected to the Abu Dahdah network were apparently aware of and may have
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helped to facilitate the 2001 visits of Muhammad
‘Ata’ and Ramzi bin al-Shayb to Spain. Between July
9 and July 16 of that year, the two 9/11 conspirators
met near the city of Tarragona to discuss further operational details and potential pitfalls concerning the
forthcoming “planes operation,” details that were
subsequently transmitted by al-Shayb to al-Qa‘ida
Central.119 Al-Shayb likewise flew to Madrid on September 5 and rented a room for 2 days prior to flying
to Dubai via Athens on September 7. According to the
Spanish indictment, four members of the Abu Dahdah
network may have provided cover and support for
these activities—the Algerian Muhammad ibn al-Fatmi, al-Shabli, al-‘Azizi, and Abu Dahdah himself.120 On
May 26, al-Fatmi called Abu Dahdah and made several cryptic remarks suggesting that he may have had
foreknowledge of major operations to come, such as
“the brothers have to hurry” and “you should consign
the stuff soon.” In June al-Fatmi moved to an apartment in Tarragona, very near to the area where ‘Ata’
and al-Shayb met the following month, and shortly
after those meetings he began making preparations to
move to Karachi, where he flew on September 3, along
with three other Algerian jihadists linked to the 9/11
cell, including Sa‘id bin al-Hajji (whose address book
contained Abu Dahdah’s old phone number). Furthermore, al-‘Azizi’s close associate al-Shabli phoned Abu
Dahdah on September 5, the same day that al-Shayb
arrived in Madrid, and made a comment about “Muhammad the Algerian” (i.e., al-Fatmi) before being cut
off by Abu Dahdah, who was concerned that he might
make compromising remarks. In the months before
9/11, there were also a series of suggestive phone
calls between someone named “Shakur” (the alias of a
Moroccan based in the United Kingdom [UK] named
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Fakhit Hilali) and Abu Dahdah, in which allusions
were seemingly made to the planned hijackings, e.g.,
one on August 27, 2001, in which Shakur said, “In
our lessons, we have entered the field of aviation and
have cut the bird’s throat.”121 In any event, the role of
the Abu Dahdah network in this and other al-Qa‘ida
operations was considered sufficiently important that,
after years of being closely monitored by the Spanish police, its key cadres were arrested in “Operación
Dátil” on November 13-14, only 2 months after the
9/11 attacks.
Some remarks must now be made about certain
key members of the two components of the 3/11 cell,
beginning with individuals in the operational cell who
had documented affiliations with other jihadist organizations and networks. The first of these was Fakhit,
whose social and educational background was quite
elevated in comparison to that of most other members
of the cell.122 Fakhit was born in Tunis in 1968 into a
Westernized upper middle class family.123 His father
and mother both worked for the Tunisian foreign
ministry, and helped arrange for Fakhit, an outstanding student, to obtain a scholarship administered by
the Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional
(Spanish Agency for International Cooperation) so that
he could study Economics at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. Fakhit arrived in Madrid in 1996 to
commence his studies and, thanks to a substantial academic stipend and financial assistance from his family, was able to live very well. When he first arrived,
the shy, culturally conservative Tunisian sometimes
joined his fellow students in attending discotheques
and other “infidel” social outings, but he soon shifted
gears and began publicly criticizing Western policies
towards Islam, spending more of his free time wor-

67

shipping at the Saudi-funded M-30 mosque, studying
the Qur’an intensively there, and becoming increasingly prominent in mosque activities. This enabled
him to visit Mecca in 1998, after which he became even
more religiously devout. Eventually, Fakhit became
an “inflexible Islamist and assiduous orator” at the
M-30 mosque.124 However, he soon began gravitating
towards more radical personalities who sought to use
the mosque as a recruiting ground, and over time he
and his new associates grew increasingly hostile to the
relatively moderate Wahhabi imam of the mosque, the
Egyptian Mahmud al-Munir.125
In 1999 and 2000, Fakhit began attending periodic weekend picnics along the Alberche River with
Syrian Islamists Muhannad al-Mallah Dabas and his
brother Mu’taz (who was directly connected to Abu
Qatada and other al-Qa‘ida’s leaders in Europe), al‘Azizi, Abu Dahdah, and various mosque-goers, gettogethers where he and these latter attendees were
further exposed to jihadist propaganda. The regular
members of this group, one of whose leaders was the
veteran mujahid al-‘Azizi, eventually began referring
to themselves as the Ikhwan al-Shuhada (Brotherhood
of Martyrs). Meanwhile, Fakhit began inviting select
mosque-goers to an apartment at Virgen del Coro
14, where Muhannad al-Mallah and other extremists
played “atrocity” and pro-jihadist videos in an effort
to anger and radicalize them. According to the police,
moreover, by 2001 Fakhit had converted his own residence into a “place of lodging and cover for young
Muslims undergoing a process of radical conversion,”
but in exchange the lodgers had to abide by strict
Taliban-style regulations against listening to music or
watching television.126 After the 9/11 attacks, Shuhada
and al-Qa‘ida members openly broke with the imam
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of the M-30 mosque, who had publicly condemned the
devastating attacks that the former instead referred to
positively as “white Tuesday,” white being the color
associated by Muslims with purity. Indeed, they eventually accused al-Munir, in true takfiri fashion, of being a “hypocrite” and an “infidel.”127
After the arrests of Abu Dahdah and his main lieutenants, Fakhit and other less prominent members of
the network assumed a low profile for a while before
coalescing and resuming their plotting anew. In 2002
the Tunisian joined a new group headed by al-Maymuni that was known as the Harakat al-Salafiyya alJihadiyya (Jihadist Salafist Movement).128 This small
group, whose members included al-Maymuni, Fakhit,
al-Shabli, Muhammad al-Arbi bin Salam, al-Falah,
and others, began holding lengthy regular meetings,
both at the residence of Faysal al-‘Ush and during
excursions to the Alberche River, where intense discussions continued about how, when, and where to
best attack the “Crusaders.” The most important issue
was whether group members should go off to fight
on foreign battlefields or instead wage jihad directly
against the “infidel” societies where they resided; this
latter option was eventually chosen after Spain sent
troops to participate in the U.S. invasion of Iraq.129 Key
members of this Salafiyya group then hooked up with
another small group of militants that had been formed
in Spain by Muhammad the Egyptian, which included the Syrian ex-engineering student Basil Ghalyun,
Muhannad and Mu’taz al-Mallah, and a Moroccan
student of aeronautical engineering named Fu‘ad alMurabit Amghar.130 Personnel from these two groups
subsequently formed the kernel of the operational
component of the 3/11 cell. Last but certainly not least,
in the latter half of 2003, in the course of frequenting
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various Maghribi locales in the Calle Tribulete area
in Madrid’s Lavapiés district, including the Tanger
barbershop (where many cell members collectively
drank water that had been blessed and brought from
Mecca by its proprietor, ‘Abd al-Wahid ibn al-Arraj),
the al-Manara halal butcher shop, the Alhambra Cafeteria and Restaurant, and Zugham’s Siglo Nuevo
phone shop, Fakhit developed a close friendship with
Jamal Ahmidan.131 Their growing collaboration soon
brought Fakhit’s group into the orbit of Ahmidan’s
own criminal network, which thence provided key
logistical support for the 3/11 attacks. In fact, both
men were later accused of placing explosive devices
inside trains on that tragic day, and both then ended
up “martyring” themselves in the Leganés apartment.
Most importantly in this context, Fakhit’s transformation into an Islamist extremist was facilitated
personally and directly, at various stages, by key individuals linked to al-Qa‘ida. One of these was Ahmad
Ibrahim, a Moroccan whose daughter Nura for a time
became Fakhit’s fiancée. Ibrahim made his living for
over a decade by selling recreational boats in Palma
de Mallorca, wore a waist-length beard, and forced
both his Finnish wife and their daughter to wear a
black burqa. He was arrested in 2002 near Barcelona
by the GC after Judge Ismael Moreno accused him of
being al-Qa‘ida’s main financial operative in Spain.
During several trips to Palma between 2000 and 2002,
Fakhit had received personal ideological instruction
from Ibrahim.132 A second important influence in
Fakhit’s transformation was the Afghan returnee al‘Azizi, who became the leader of the Shuhada group
in whose social activities Fakhit regularly participated, and also provided frequent guidance on ideological matters.133 A third was Abu Dahdah himself, an-
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other regular Shuhada group attendee whose network
Fakhit later joined, thereby becoming increasingly
integrated into that milieu prior to its decapitation
and partial dismantling in late 2001.134 A fourth was
al-Maymuni, who also attended or hosted gatherings
of the Shuhada group. Fakhit and al-Maymuni, both
acolytes of al-‘Azizi, later became so close that the
Tunisian allowed al-Maymuni’s wife Nayat to move
into his apartment and married al-Maymuni’s daughter Hanani.135 In 2002, a confidential police informant
nicknamed “Cartagena” (who was later identified as
‘Abd al-Qadir al-Farsawi, the imam of the al-Taqwa
mosque in the Villaverde district in southern Madrid),
reported that al-Maymuni had formed and become
the leader of the aforementioned Salafiyya group,
which included Fakhit. Indeed, when al-Maymuni left
Spain in early 2003 in order to organize jihadist cells
in Morocco (activities for which he was arrested by
the Moroccan authorities in the wake of the May 2003
Casablanca bombings), Fakhit replaced him as the
new leader of the group.136 A fifth was Muhammad
the Egyptian. In the wake of the flight from Spain of
several important members of al-Qa‘ida’s European
network, including al-‘Azizi, Fakhit not only became
a de facto leader of remnants of Abu Dahdah’s group
but also a disciple of the Egyptian’s, who had returned
to Spain in the summer of 2002.137 In short, the primary
animator of the 3/11 cell had long operated within the
orbit of leading al-Qa‘ida figures in Spain, who had
personally overseen his ongoing religious, political, and
ideological indoctrination and radicalization. How, then,
can anyone seriously argue that the 3/11 cell was a
“self-starter” group that had no meaningful connections to al-Qa‘ida?
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Another important member of the 3/11 operational cell was Jamal Zugham, who as noted above had become a member of the al-Qa‘ida network in Spain and
a close personal friend of Abu Dahdah’s.138 On March
13, 2003, after the two Indian shopkeepers who had
sold the phones and SIM cards to the plotters identified Zugham as the individual who had purchased
the latter, investigators from the UCIE immediately
became alarmed given that he was already very wellknown to the anti-terrorist police.139 Zugham was
born in 1973 in Tangiers, and was the eldest son of the
mu’adhdhin at the mosque in the city’s Shar ibn Dibani
neighborhood. In 1985 he arrived in Spain, where he
initially found work as a fruit dealer in the San Fernando market on Calle Tribulete. Like many immigrants,
he eventually opened up his own small shop, drifted
into various semi-licit economic activities, and found
it more comforting to associate with other North Africans in Lavapiés, including his relatives and countrymen, than to interact socially with Spaniards. As
a result, he ended up befriending several individuals
in the area who had joined Abu Dahdah’s network,
including Sa‘id al-Shadadi, or thence found their way
into its bastard offspring, the 3/11 cell, such as Rashid
Akhlif.140
Zugham’s increasing involvement in the activities
of various components of al-Qa‘ida’s network in Europe was confirmed on August 10, 2001, when UCIE
agents surreptitiously entered and searched his apartment at Calle de Sequillo 14.141 They did so at the request of French judicial authorities after David Courtailler, a French convert to Islam who joined a jihadist
cell that had planned to attack the American embassy
in Paris, admitted that he had had a meeting with
Zugham in a Madrid mosque in 1998.142 In the course
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of that search, the policemen discovered that Zugham
possessed the phone number of al-‘Azizi. Similarly,
in Abu Dahdah’s appointment book confiscated during the “Dátil” investigation, Zugham’s number was
listed under the heading “Jamal from Tangiers.” This
and several other indicators led investigators to conclude that Zugham functioned as the virtual dauphin
(heir apparent) of Abu Dahdah.143 Whether or not that
is true, there is no doubt that the former had “extensive international connections with figures involved
in some way or another with the jihad,” including
the Norway-based “spiritual leader” of the Kurdish
jihadist group Ansar al-Islam, Najm al-Din Faraj Ahmad (alias Mullah Krikar), and several militants who
played important roles in Moroccan jihadist groups.144
For that very reason, Zugham was subsequently investigated by Judge Garzón in connection with the
multiple May 16, 2003, terrorist attacks carried out in
Casablanca by a cell from al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya,
since he was closely linked to a member of that network, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Ya‘ish, who the Moroccan
authorities believed was involved in those bombings
and therefore sought to have extradited from Spain.
Zugham also was inspired by and had personal interactions with Muhammad al-Fizazi, an extremely
radical Moroccan imam who had not only previously
exerted a powerful ideological influence on ‘Ata’ and
several future 9/11 hijackers during his stint preaching at the al-Quds (Jerusalem) mosque in Hamburg,
but was also widely regarded as one of the spiritual
leaders of al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya and other terrorist
groups in his homeland.145 Later, in the weeks before
the Madrid bombings, Zugham reportedly attended
gatherings together with other 3/11 cell members at
the Chinchón house.146 After the attacks, Zugham was
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quickly arrested when the SIM card found in the unexploded bomb at the El Pozo station was traced to
the batch purchased by his store. He was subsequently identified by two surviving train passengers as the
individual they had seen leaving a bag on the train car
they were riding in, which then blew up.
A third figure who played a vital role in the 3/11
bombings was Jamal Ahmidan. Although much—
arguably too much—has been made about the poor
slums in Moroccan cities as alleged breeding grounds
of jihadism, Ahmidan was born in 1970 in Tetuan into
a relatively well-off middle class family and had 13
siblings.147 His father Ahmad had worked in Holland
for several years in order to make his fortune, leaving
his wife at home, but when he returned he had sufficient funds to set up a fabric business and eventually was able to buy a second house on the beach in
Tangiers. He was religious and hoped that his sons
would be inspired by his own example, but Jamal
was always very headstrong, hotheaded, and impulsive, and ended up dropping out of high school. Both
he and his elder brother Mustafa loved their mother
Rahma but had a strained relationship with their father, and as a result, both began engaging in drug trafficking rather than following in Ahmad’s respectable
footsteps. At first they made money selling Moroccan
hashish directly in Spain, or instead selling it in Holland in exchange for cocaine and MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine or “ecstasy”), which
they then sold in Spain. In 1991 Jamal followed two
of his brothers to Madrid, but managed to enter Spain
only by falsely claiming to be an Algerian seeking
asylum. After settling in the Spanish capital, he soon
formed his own criminal network that was composed
largely of friends and kinsmen from home. As time
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progressed, he expanded the range of his criminal activities, and eventually became involved in car theft,
burglaries, robberies, selling false documentation, and
other illicit transactions in addition to drug trafficking, not only in Madrid but also in Bilbao and southern Spain. Quick to anger and resort to violence, Jamal
always carried weapons with him and very quickly
developed a fearsome reputation on the street that
only facilitated his dirty business activities. He also
drank, popped pills, snorted drugs himself, and initially spent time partying, both with Spanish women
and in Moroccan discotheques. That temporary hedonistic phase was curtailed somewhat in the summer of
1992, when he met and fell in love with a Spanish heroin addict named Rosa, whom he thenceforth doted
on to the point that he helped her kick her drug habit
and reconcile her with her estranged mother. During
a visit home in 1993, he stabbed a lad who was trying
to steal from him while he was asleep in a taxi, but fled
back to Spain before he could be prosecuted.148
How did this troubled criminal end up embracing
Islamism and being associated with the jihadist cell that
carried out the Madrid bombings? Some have suggested that, after being arrested for trafficking in December
1993 and then sentenced to 2 years in the Carabanchel
and Valdemoro prisons, where he became temporarily addicted to heroin, he first sought solace in Islam
in an effort to end his drug dependency.149 When he
was released in October 1995, he became increasingly
religious, stopped taking drugs, and pressured other
Arabs near the local garage mosque not to get high.150
Moreover, he started spending time discussing Islam
with the imam at that same mosque, as well as paying a portion of the proceeds from his illicit activities
in the form of alms (zakat) to the M-30 and Abu Bakr
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mosques in Madrid.151 However, it seems to have been
his growing anger and ever-increasing sense of victimization after successive arrests that really led to his
radicalization. In 1998, he emerged from a stint in a
French prison with a beard and a temporary desire to
pray five times per day, and began obsessing about
the plight of the Chechens and Palestinians.152 On a
1999 business trip to Amsterdam, he was further radicalized by the imam of a small mosque, to which he
then made a charitable contribution.153 In March 2001
he was arrested with false documents and imprisoned
again, this time in the Centro de Inmigrantes Extranjeros (Center for Foreign Immigrants[CIE]) in Madrid,
which prompted him to become the de facto leader of
the other prisoners and to adopt an increasingly hostile
attitude towards his “infidel” country of residence.154
He actually managed to escape from the CIE on April
16, 2000, at which point he went out of his way to call
his former guards to threaten and taunt them. In December 2000 he returned to Morocco to straighten out
his identity documentation problems, but was arrested there within a few days for the murder of the boy
he had stabbed years before.155 He spent over 3 years
in a Moroccan prison, during which time—like many
other Muslim petty criminals who have gone through
similar experiences—he completed his radicalization
process and began nursing a desire to kill the enemies
of Allah. He was also apparently angered by the U.S.
invasion of Iraq.
Hence by the time he was released from prison in
the summer of 2003, Ahmidan was ideologically and
psychologically primed to join a jihadist cell, and his
fortuitous encounter with Fakhit later that year soon
led to his active involvement in the 3/11 plot. Moreover, despite his frequently reckless behavior, even in
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the weeks before the attacks,156 he was a great asset
to the cell because he possessed good organizational
skills, had considerable experience conducting clandestine activities, and had the sort of personal charisma that made him a good leader who could inspire
others.
It again needs to be emphasized that the first two
of the three above figures, all of whom played important roles in the 3/11 cell, had been affiliated for
years with jihadist networks in Spain and beyond. As
a result, they were heavily influenced by and often
interacted personally with a host of veteran jihadists,
including those who were associated with al-Qa‘ida,
the GICM, and other terrorist groups. Indeed, these
webs of interconnections, both among cell members
and between them and other jihadists, were so dense
and extensive that the 2004 Spanish indictment against
the surviving plotters devoted over 500 pages to tracing the cell members’ phone contacts and interactions
(since many of their phone calls were by then being
monitored and recorded by the police).157 The indictment then spent another 100 pages tracing their contacts with jihadists in Belgium, France, Italy, and Morocco, including details about the post-attack flights
of al-Falah and al-Hajj, on the basis of information
found in judicial investigations carried out in those
countries.158 It is precisely because of their extensive
contacts and frequent interactions with jihadist operatives linked to al-Qa‘ida, the GICM or al-Salafiyya
al-Jihadiyya, and the GIA that many observers have
concluded, rightly or wrongly, that the attacks were
secretly sponsored, guided, or directed by higher-ups
within those veteran organizations.159 Since the general impact of al-Qa‘ida operatives on the recruitment
and radicalization of certain cell members has been
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discussed above, and the cell’s main link to the GIA
was through al-Amari, about whose importance there
is considerable debate, a bit more information should
be provided on the cell’s Moroccan connections.
In this context, the key figures involved are alMaymuni, al-‘Azizi, al-Hajj, and Hasan al-Haski. As
has been noted, the role of al-Maymuni was central
to the development of the 3/11 cell since he was the
leader of the Spanish al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya group,
one of the two intersecting groups from which that
cell emerged. Had he not gone to Morocco to organize new jihadist cells and plan attacks there, perhaps
including the 2003 Casablanca suicide bombings, he
may well have ended up as an integral member of the
Madrid operational cell. Like Abu Dahdah, al-Maymuni had earlier helped recruit volunteers to wage
jihad in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and according
to his close comrade al-‘Azizi, after Abu Dahdah’s
arrest he formed two cells that were integrated into
al-Qa‘ida, one in Spain (presumably the al-Salafiyya
al-Jihadiyya group) and one in the Moroccan town of
Kanitra, which was later implicated in the 2003 Casablanca attacks.160
As for al-‘Azizi, he was a veteran mujahid who had
received training in terrorist camps, first in the Bosnian
industrial town of Zenica and then later in Afghanistan.161 Indeed, according to some accounts, he served
as Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s protégé at the al-Ghuraba’
camp in Afghanistan, or as an instructor (together
with al-Suri) in the Abu Khabab camp in the Darunta
complex.162 Whatever the specifics, he was regarded as
a “big fish” who had direct connections with al-Qa‘ida
Central and later became Abu Dahdah’s right-hand
man in Spain.163 He has also been portrayed as “the
leader of the GICM,” which many regard as Moroc-
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co’s primary al-Qa‘ida affiliate.164 Some have further
claimed that he provided organizational and logistical assistance to the 9/11 plotters during their summer 2001 meetings in northeastern Spain—of interest
in this context is that his phone number was found
in the phone book of Zakariyyas Musawi, a projected
participant in “second wave” al-Qa‘ida attacks inside
the United States in the wake of “blessed Tuesday”—
and he subsequently exerted a strong influence over
the group headed by al-Maymuni after Abu Dahdah’s
arrest.165 Moreover, he was a key participant at an
important February 2002 jihadist summit in Istanbul,
where the representatives of numerous North African
terrorist groups, including several that were affiliated
with al-Qa‘ida, gathered to devise a new strategy in
response to the American overthrow of the Taliban
regime. At that meeting, a decision was reportedly
made to launch new waves of terrorist attacks, including inside Western countries. Some have argued
that plans to attack Spain, which later materialized on
3/11, were hatched at that meeting.166
Yusuf bin al-Hajj was yet another member of the
GICM with close links to al-Qa‘ida who was later
suspected of being the mastermind of the 3/11 bombings. He set up a base of operations in Belgium, and
regularly used a network he had established there to
repatriate Afghan veterans to their countries of origin or find them refuge elsewhere, as well as to help
fugitive terrorists escape from European police dragnets.167 Among other things, he helped facilitate the
post-3/11 flight from Spain of both his own brother
Muhammad (who had been in the apartment at Leganés but had left before the police cordoned it off
and laid siege to it) and al-Falah, and also the latter’s
subsequent transit to Iraq.168 In 2001, Yusuf had held
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several meetings in a mosque in Leganés with alFalah, his brother Maymun, his nephews the Musatin
brothers, and Abu Shar to discuss jihad and going to
fight in Afghanistan. However, the oddest fact in the
accusations leveled against al-Hajj is that on October
19, 2003, 1 day after al-Jazira broadcast a public statement by Usama bin Ladin threatening Spain for its
involvement in Iraq, he bought a new Belgian mobile
phone, for which he provided a false name and the
incorrect birth date of March 11, 1921, information
that was then entered into the phone’s SIM card. Not
only did al-Hajj know that this particular month and
day fell shortly before the following year’s Spanish
elections, but he also apparently believed that it was
exactly 2 1/2 years after the 9/11 attacks. One might
assume that it was a sheer coincidence that the month
and day happened to correspond to those of the future
3/11 attacks had not al-Hajj provided another false
date of birth that was entered into the SIM card of his
other cell phone—May 16, 1985—the month and day
of which happened to correspond, also in advance, to
those of the Casablanca bombings in 2003.169 Whether
he intentionally selected those dates in order to secretly alert his contacts in Madrid, including cell member
Abu Shar, about exactly when their projected attacks
were to be launched, as the public prosecutor claimed,
is unclear.
A final GICM operative who was accused at one
point of being the “planner” of the Madrid bombings
was Hasan al-Haski. Between 2000 and 2002, al-Haski
lived in the Canary Islands in Las Palmas, but at the
end of 2002 he went to Syria, ostensibly to deepen his
knowledge of Islamic theology.170 However, in his capacity as a GICM leader, he spent much of his time
there indoctrinating a group of Syrians, Algerians,
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and Moroccans whom he was preparing to send to
Iraq via Turkey. While in Syria he also met with Muhsin Khaybar, who was later implicated in the 2003
Casablanca bombings, to discuss the future leadership of the GICM, and later attended a meeting in the
Belgian town of Genk, at which ‘Abd al-Qadir Hakimi
and other representatives of the organization allegedly devised a common strategy and discussed who
would succeed its current ‘amir. In February and early
March of 2004 al-Haski stayed with various “brothers” in France, but appeared to be very nervous and
restless, perhaps because he knew about the forthcoming attacks. After 3/11 he suddenly became calm,
claimed that the train bombings had been carried out
by his “group” (jama‘a), and openly expressed both
pride and satisfaction about the successful results of
the operation. Nonetheless, between mid-April and
early May, he traveled back to the Canaries.171
Given that so many GICM operational leaders
were linked, at various points, to members of the 3/11
cell, it is no wonder that both the GICM itself and the
transnational network it had affiliated itself with, that
of al-Qa‘ida, were both depicted as the sponsors or
masterminds of the Madrid bombings. Nor were such
charges leveled solely against Moroccan extremists.
The same was also true of Rabi‘ ‘Uthman al-Sayyid
Ahmad (Muhammad the Egyptian), a key figure in alQa‘ida’s logistical network in Italy who had extensive
interactions with the “brothers” in the Abu Dahdah
network, its reconfigured successors, and the 3/11 cell
itself, right up until a few weeks before the attacks.
His long-standing role in radicalizing, recruiting, and
then transferring European militants to jihadist fronts
elsewhere has been thoroughly documented in the
course of a series of Italian judicial investigations and
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trials. He was born in Egypt in 1971, had a degree in
electronics from an Egyptian technical school, and
served in the Egyptian army—specifically the specialized Explosives Brigade in Port Said—for 5 years.
However, he was also secretly a member of the Tanzim al-Jihad al-Islami, and was therefore imprisoned
during the mid-1990s in Abu Zaba‘al jail.172 He later
made his way to Europe, and was arrested in Germany in 1999 after trying to cross the border into France
without proper papers. He then falsely claimed to be
a Palestinian refugee and was sent to a camp in Lebech for asylum seekers whose applications were being processed, where he became the principal imam, a
position he used to spread radical Islamist doctrines.
He managed to escape from the lightly guarded camp,
and then made his way, first to Spain in January 2001
to find a wife, then to France to make contact with jihadist circles, then back to Spain to continue radicalizing and recruiting jihadists, and still later to Italy to
establish a new base of operations.173
Following the arrest of his collaborator Abu Dahdah, Muhammad the Egyptian assumed a much greater leadership role in Spanish jihadist circles after gathering some of the former’s men together and forming
a new group in Lavapiés, one that included several of
the later 3/11 cell members, including Ghalyun and
Amghar. Members of his group also increasingly interacted with the “brothers” in the above-mentioned
group led by al-Maymuni, which included Fakhit.
Indeed, Ahmad and al-Maymuni had both spent considerable time recruiting and radicalizing militants at
the M-30 mosque.174 Although Ahmad left Spain at the
very end of January 2004, only a few weeks before the
train attacks, a witness claimed that he had previously
seen him at the Chinchón house.175 This in turn caused
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some analysts to speculate that Ahmad was not only a
key planner behind the bombings, but also that he may
have provided instructions on how to fabricate bombs
directly to certain 3/11 cell members.176 Several phone
calls that were subsequently intercepted by the Italian
police seemed to support the interpretation that Ahmad was involved in planning the action. For example, in a May 24, 2004, conversation with a would-be
Moroccan “martyr” living in Belgium named Murad
al-Shabaru (whom he had known since they first met
in Tarazona in 2002), Ahmad made an allusion to the
Madrid bombers and referred to them as “the boys,”
“our friends,” “my brother” Sirhan [Fakhit], and the
rest of “the brothers,” all of whom “went to Allah.”177
Two days later, in a conversation with a young Palestinian protégé named Yahya Bayuni, who Ahmad was
grooming to be a martyr, the latter said:
There is one thing that I am not going to hide from
you: [lowering his voice] the attack in Madrid was
my project and those who died [as] martyrs are my
very dear friends. . . . I am the thread of Madrid, when
the deed happened I wasn’t there, but I’ll tell you the
truth, before the operation, on the 4th, I had contacts
with them . . . keep your mouth shut . . . I go around
alone, [but] they worked in [a] group. . . . Five [sic]
died martyrs and eight have been arrested; they are
the best friends, dearest friends, very loyal . . . already
on the 4th I began to plan, but at a high level, I wanted
to plan it so that it was something that was unforgettable. . . . I wanted a big load but I couldn’t find the
means. The plan cost me a lot of money and patience,
it took me 2 1/2 years . . . beware!! . . . Don’t you ever
mention anything. . . .178

Even if one assumes that Ahmad was simply a
blabbermouth and a braggart who exaggerated his
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own role rather than one of the actual planners of the
attack or instead concludes, as the Spanish judges did,
that the translation of this last conversation was flawed
and that he had really said something else,179 there can
no doubt whatsoever that members of the group he
led in Spain, along with members of the group headed
by al-Maymuni, later went on to join forces and carry
out the 3/11 attacks. Hence at the very least, Ahmad
played a significant role in helping to reorganize elements of Abu Dahdah’s recently decapitated al-Qa‘ida
network in Spain into a new cell, as well as in instigating, directly or indirectly, the attacks that followed by
incessantly urging his followers to wage jihad.
Be that as it may, the identification by investigators, both official and unofficial, of a seemingly endless succession of alleged “intellectual authors” of the
Madrid bombings has given free rein to cynical or
conspiratorially-minded critics of the constantly shifting official version. For example, De Pablo has sardonically noted that the prosecutors and judges had
identified no less than 10 individuals as the “masterminds” of the attacks, but that none of them were actually charged (and many were not even mentioned) in
either the 2007 sentence or that of the Appeals Court 1
year later.180 However, the failure to definitively identify such a person or group, at least thus far, does not
necessarily mean that there were no intellectual authors behind the material perpetrators. Indeed, such
intellectual authors must have existed, even if they
were to be found among the material perpetrators
rather than hypothesized secret sponsors or behindthe-scenes controllers.
Unfortunately, the problems involved in tracing
the ultimate sponsors or masterminds of the 3/11 attacks—if indeed they exist—are formidable and there-
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fore difficult to resolve, simply because of the complex
and fluid nature of the web of linkages and interconnections between different networks, organizations,
and cells that make up the global jihadist milieu. Perhaps the best summary of these problems, in reference
to the relationships between al-Qa‘ida, the GICM, and
local cells, has been provided by Malika Zeghal:
The logic that nowadays governs the constitution and
evolution of jihadist terrorism is that of looser and
looser networks. They are made up, on the one hand,
of branches that are not necessarily structured, and
about which one knows little concerning their extension, and are formed by means of individual movements and unexpected encounters in an era of [extensive] migratory movements throughout the world;
and, on the other hand, of ‘nodes’ emerging from
these encounters, which are so many cells organized
in a flexible manner. These can either follow external
orders or become independent; and they can easily
mutate and multiply independently of any command
center, such as that of al-Qaida, while still remaining
inspired by it.181

This concise but shrewd characterization accurately describes the ongoing organizational shift away
from the sort of hierarchically-structured terrorist
groups that constituted the norm in the late 1960s and
1970s towards more decentralized, diffuse, and loose
network structures.
The decentralized and compartmentalized GICM
network shares those very same traits, since its nodes
are effectively led by different ‘umara operating in the
field rather than by its nominal supreme leaders. As
one Spanish journalist described the situation:

85

It is extremely difficult, not only to determine the configuration of the operational leadership of the GICM,
but also to identify its structure, its degree of national
implantation, and its international connections, of
which tentacles have been detected in Spain, Great
Britain, Belgium, Italy, Turkey, and Denmark. It is a
design with a special role [protagonismo] for insulated
cells and independent elements with a scant or nonexistent level of knowledge concerning the “grand
strategy” of [the parent] organization, which recruits
operatives who have been tied to Salafism, both in
Morocco and in the Muslim community implanted in
Europe.182

Moreover, the GICM, which was initially formed
(as the Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Maghribiyya [Moroccan Islamic Movement]) in Peshawar in 1993 by Moroccan veterans of the Afghan war, trained Moroccan
operatives in the Abu Khabab camp, and endeavored
to forge a common North African jihadist front with
the GIA, GSPC, and the Tanzim al-Jihad, was reconstituted in 1998, in part to facilitate the execution of
attacks encouraged or sponsored by al-Qa‘ida Central
within its own geographic spheres of operation. The
GICM’s cells in North Africa and Europe were not part
of the organic structure of al-Qa‘ida, but could nonetheless act in support of that organization’s broader
objectives or aid al-Qa‘ida operatives logistically.183
Hence, according to Merlos, Spanish Socialist Workers Party (Partido Socialista Obrore Espanol [PSOE])
leader José Luis Rodríguez Zapateros oversimplified
greatly when he claimed that the 9/11 and 3/11 attacks were completely different in terms of their motivational, organizational, and operational matrix.
On the contrary, all of the different levels of jihadist
networks intermingled in complex ways in the period
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leading up to the 3/11 attacks.184 This does not mean,
however, that one can trace a clear line of authorship
behind those attacks leading from al-Qa‘ida Central
to the leaders of the GICM to the members of the Madrid cell, since we are dealing with a decentralized alQa‘ida network, a decentralized GICM network, and
individual cells that were linked to elements of both in
a very convoluted and confusing fashion.
However that may be, Zeghal’s above-cited description does not quite conform to John Arquilla’s
interesting notions about “all-channel” or “swarming” networks, much less to other theories postulating
the primacy of “leaderless resistance” or autonomous
“self-generating” cells with no meaningful links to
other organizations and networks.185 This is because in
the real world, various jihadist cells or groupuscules
(i.e., “grouplets”) that suddenly coalesce—whether in
accordance with pre-established plans or spontaneously and unexpectedly—may in some instances end
up following orders issued by other, more influential
and resource-rich organizations or networks to which
they have become affiliated, on other occasions decide
to collaborate on an ad hoc basis with other cells in order to facilitate the carrying out of particular actions,
and at still other times be acting entirely on their own
initiative. Indeed, the very same grouplet may well
shift back and forth between these distinct and seemingly antithetical behavioral patterns. Since those
three patterns are not necessarily mutually exclusive,
either in time or in space, the resulting organizational
and interactive fluidity makes it all the more difficult
for outsiders to determine exactly when particular
cells may be acting independently and when they may
be cooperating with or acting at the behest of other
parties. This is certainly the case with the Madrid
bombings.
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For that very reason, it is possible to view the 3/11
plot as either the product of schemes hatched by elements from veteran foreign terrorist organizations
with which several cell members had been or still
were linked, including al-Qa‘ida and the GICM, or
to view it as an action that was undertaken more or
less independently and on the personal initiative of
key figures within that cell. Thus, there is a fairly wide
spectrum of reasonable interpretations that could conceivably be derived from the existing facts, but the
truth surely lies between the two opposite poles on
that interpretive spectrum. Indeed, the two interpretations that are the least likely to be true are those at the
termini of this wide spectrum of possibilities: 1) that
the majlis al-shura of al-Qa‘ida (i.e., al-Qa‘ida Central)
directly ordered the attacks, or 2) that they were carried out independently by a “self-starter” cell without
assistance of any kind from jihadists in other organizations. Unfortunately, this latter view has currently
become the accepted wisdom, in part because it has
been reinforced by the excessive caution of certain
trial and appellate judges, who ended up concluding
that the 3/11 attacks were not only “without intellectual authorship,” an absurd claim, but also that there
was no meaningful involvement at all by personnel
from other jihadist cells or networks. While the more
extravagant claims attributing sponsorship or planning of the bombings to the leadership directorates
of al-Qa‘ida or the GICM remain unconvincing, since
the evidence cited in support of those claims is at best
only suggestive, it is also difficult if not impossible to
accept the seemingly naïve verdicts rendered by the
two courts, which in the end concluded that there was
no form of external involvement in the 3/11 operation—despite the wealth of documented connections
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between cell members and other jihadist circles, both
in the recent past and even, in some cases, in the days
leading up to the attacks.
In this context, it should be emphasized that judicial decisions should never be regarded as infallible
or as “the gospel truth.” After all, judges frequently
make errors in judgment and other types of mistakes,
like professionals in all other fields, and at times they
resort to legal reasoning that is not only tortuous but
also seems bizarre or even perverse.186 Moreover, their
ability to remain disinterested or objective has often
been undermined by a host of other factors, such as
highly politicized judiciaries (especially in countries
with proportional representation) in which ideological biases of varying sorts are often blatant,187 political
pressures exerted overtly or covertly by the executive
branch,188 the corrosive impact of unofficial patronage systems marked by behind-the-scenes exchanges
of reciprocal favors, flaws, or loopholes built into the
structures of their nation’s legal institutions,189 and
even feelings of collective societal guilt in countries
with formerly dictatorial regimes (like Germany, Italy,
and Spain) that abused their power egregiously and
thereby destroyed the rule of law. Under such circumstances, it has all too often been the case that courts in
Europe have failed to convict suspected jihadist terrorists, despite the existence of considerable amounts
of evidence that pointed to their guilt, usually on the
basis of seemingly spurious reasoning or by throwing
out cases on the basis of technicalities.190
In any event, having briefly surveyed the innumerable interconnections between members of the 3/11
cell and jihadists associated with other organizations
and networks, it should already be apparent that the
notion that the Madrid cell was an essentially autonomous, “self-generating” cell composed of amateurish
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jihadist “newbies” is utterly absurd. Nor can one claim,
as Atran has, that this particular cell had no significant
connections, operational or otherwise, to elements of
al-Qa‘ida or other jihadist terrorist organizations. On
the contrary, it was made up of numerous veteran
militants, including several who were associated with
Abu Dahdah’s al-Qa‘ida network in Spain. Yet Atran
and others, including certain judges associated with
the case, have sarcastically asked where al-Qa‘ida was
in the context of 3/11. This seems to be a case of ideologically- or conceptually-driven perceptual blindness, willful or otherwise, since the influence of elements of al-Qa‘ida and other jihadist Salafist groups
was present, in a multitude of ways, during the entire
historical evolution of the cell. Several points need to
be emphasized in this regard.
First, it is ridiculous to argue that, unless a particular cell is receiving its marching orders or extensive
financial subsidies directly from Bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri, or other high-level figures from al-Qa‘ida Central, it has no links to al-Qa‘ida at all other than those
of an inspirational albeit vague ideological nature. To
make such an argument is fundamentally to misunderstand the role of al-Qa‘ida Central, including its
operational role, in relation to that of its affiliates and
local cells. In fact, even in cases where al-Qa‘ida sent
its own “hit teams” or intentionally implanted agents
from overseas to form cells, recruit locals, and thence
organize attacks in the West, it usually did not exercise close supervision or direct command, control,
and coordination over the activities of its operatives
in far-flung theatres. Far from endeavoring to micromanage the activities of its operatives, even those
who were carrying out strategic strikes that it had explicitly authorized and partially planned, it typically
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left many of the actual tactical or operational details
to them. This was even partly true of the spectacular
9/11 attacks, since ‘Ata’ was given a certain amount
of leeway in planning various logistical and operational details inasmuch as he, being in the field, was
in a better position to be able to adjust and adapt to
new, sometimes unexpected developments that might
affect the overall success of the “planes operation.”
In certain instances, of course, Bin Ladin insisted that
his operatives abroad follow a certain pre-established
plan more or less closely, but even in those cases he
was not usually able to prevent them from making periodic changes or personally to exert a high degree of
de facto operational control over them.
Since this has been the normal pattern, even in relation to those attacks overseas that were planned and
subsidized by al-Qa‘ida Central, why would anyone
assume that the group’s majlis al-shura would necessarily exercise direct operational control over the activities of local cells, including those that were linked
to its affiliates, whose specific activities it did not even
endeavor to guide or control? And why, for that matter, would they further assume that every cell that
did not receive such close levels of central supervision, guidance, or support was entirely autonomous,
unconnected, and made up of amateurish “bunches
of guys”? In short, drawing a hard and fast “either/
or” distinction between cells which were supposedly
micromanaged by al-Qa‘ida Central and those which
were totally independent has unfortunately had the
effect of creating a false dichotomy that rarely if ever
conforms to the fluidity and complexity of the linkages within the jihadist milieu in the real world.
Second, the view of Sageman that local jihadist cells
were often formed after the bottom-up recruitment
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by “born again” jihadists of their friends and kinsmen—or perhaps after their top-down recruitment by
professional jihadist spotters, who found it easier to
induce such “bunches of guys” to join together—has
in my opinion been granted far too much explanatory
power. It is hardly surprising that recent Muslim immigrants living in the West, like most émigrés from
a particular region of the world who end up settling
in societies that are very different culturally, would
initially prefer to associate with their countrymen,
co-religionists, kinsmen, and friends than with alien
members of their new societies, a tendency which
almost always produces self-segregating social patterns that initially act to inhibit assimilation and acculturation. To the extent that those same immigrants
are also subjected to some level of socio-economic discrimination, as they often are, this will only act to further alienate them from their host societies and cause
them to associate and identify even more closely with
those with whom they share a common background.
These tendencies are arguably even more common
among Muslims, most of whom arrive in Europe from
societies that are essentially tribal in nature, where
large clans and extended families are the norm, and
where there is a pronounced, sometimes fierce loyalty
to kinsmen. Hence it should come as no surprise to
learn that when individual Muslims become so alienated that they adopt an adversarial attitude towards
their host societies and/or suffer an identity crisis that
leads them to view themselves as members of the real
or virtual umma, sometimes to the point of wanting to
wage jihad against the infidel societies they reside in,
that they should first approach some of their kinsmen
and friends for support and aid. Moreover, unless
they join cults whose leaders encourage them to break
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their previous social ties, people are often inclined to
tell their closest associates the “good news” when they
have suddenly become religiously devout, and then to
try to convert them to their new worldview.
This reliance on kinsmen and friends is likewise
true of those individuals who had embraced an Islamist worldview even before arriving in the West,
since they were already ideologically conditioned to
view their new land as a part of the dar al-harb, i.e.,
as a “satanic” society filled with “infidel Crusaders” who were out to destroy Islam. For this very
reason, they often eschew unnecessary contact with
non-Muslims, whom they view as inherently corrupt
if not thoroughly evil. At times, however, they may
well seek to manipulate and make instrumental use
of certain unwitting unbelievers in pursuit of their
radically anti-Western objectives. It is also common
for individuals who intend to engage in illicit or subversive clandestine activities to have recourse first to
friends and kinsmen, which is why one so often finds
close kinship relations to be characteristic of criminal
gangs, organized or otherwise. It is surely no accident that criminals tend to organize themselves along
ethnic lines, e.g., into the Sicilian, Corsican, Russian,
Chechen, Nigerian, or Turkish mobs, the Japanese
yakuza, the Chinese triads, etc. After all, inviting absolute strangers to join them in illegal activities would
entail dangerous risks, whereas kinsmen and close
friends are less likely to alert the authorities even if
they opt not to participate in those types of activities.
Why, then, should one find it so surprising and significant that both jihadist cells and Muslim criminal
gangs in Europe are often composed largely of kinsmen and close friends from the same villages or towns
in their countries of origin? In short, although Sage-
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man is perfectly correct to point out this social fact,
in the final analysis it is a rather banal observation.191
Moreover, in and of itself this particular phenomenon
is only tangentially related to the key issues involved
in assessing jihadist capabilities, including both their
overall operational effectiveness and their possession
of the technical skills necessary for IED fabrication: (1)
whether the members of such cells are rank amateurs
or experienced veterans, and (2) whether those cells
are autonomous and self-generating or are instead
connected to established jihadist organizations.
What, then, are the salient facts about the members
of the 3/11 operational cell? First, after Abu Dahdah’s
Spanish al-Qa‘ida network was dismantled due to police action in November 2001, the members of that network who had escaped arrest during the sweeps either
took flight or laid low until the initial crackdown had
run its course. It was not long, however, before they
began coalescing, reorganizing, re-establishing contact with al-Qa‘ida and Moroccan jihadist operatives
elsewhere in Europe, and resuming their anti-Western
plotting and activities. Angered by the arrests of their
“brothers” and what they perceived to be attacks on
Islam at home and abroad, al-Maymuni, Fakhit, and
their associates in Madrid’s so-called Harakat alSalafiyya al-Jihadiyya began meeting regularly and
engaging in a series of intense debates about what
actions to undertake in support of the global jihad.
The key question was whether to continue recruiting and sending mujahidin from Europe to battlefields
elsewhere (as the Abu Dahdah network had done for
years), whether to go off themselves to fight on other
fronts, or whether to carry out attacks in the European
countries where they resided. In the end, angered by
the invasion of Iraq and other international events and
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further inspired both by certain public exhortations of
Bin Ladin and online statements by other global jihadist militants, sometime in 2003 they definitively opted
to carry out attacks inside Spain itself.192 Like many
other countries in Europe, Spain was therefore transformed from a jihadist logistical “rearguard” base into
a jihadist “frontline” objective or target of attack.193 In
short, what occurred was essentially a restructuring
of previously existing jihadist networks, including the
one that had originally been formed by al-Qa‘ida operatives, not—as Atran and Sageman keep insisting—
the “self-generation” of an entirely new organization
by “bunches of guys” with no tangible connections to
veteran past or present jihadist networks.
It should also be pointed out, parenthetically, that
not even Ahmidan’s criminal gang, or components
thereof, could be fairly described in 2003 as a selfgenerating organization, since Ahmidan had initially
formed his network of Moroccan criminals almost a
decade earlier and still continued to direct it, even
though the scale of its activities and its precise membership fluctuated over time, due in large part to periodic police crackdowns that resulted in the arrests of
Ahmidan or his men. Even if that network could justly
have been characterized as a self-generating criminal
group way back in the mid-1990s, when it was first
established, all “the Chinaman” had to do was reconstitute it when he was released from a Moroccan
prison in 2003. Apart from Ahmidan’s imposition of
new, religiously-derived strictures on his thugs, the
main change was that, in the months leading up to the
bombings, some of the most trustworthy members of
his crew were made aware of the projected jihadist attacks and thus became bona fide members of the 3/11
logistical cell, whereas others remained mere grunts
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who performed ancillary tasks but were unaware of
Ahmidan’s true purposes.
Second, many observers have argued that if Fakhit
and his group had not befriended and collaborated
with Jamal Ahmidan and his criminal gang, they would
never have had the wherewithal to carry out a major
terrorist attack in Spain.194 It is of course a historical
fact that the increasing interaction between Fakhit and
Ahmidan did in fact initiate a sequence of events that
ultimately resulted in the 3/11 train bombings, but
that is no reason to draw the conclusion that Fakhit’s
group would have otherwise never been able to carry
out such an attack. It is true that the operational group
was temporarily short of resources, so much so that
both Fakhit and Ahmidan made efforts to collect past
debts in the weeks before 3/11,195 but this was mainly
due to the crackdown on and resulting disruption of
the al-Qa‘ida network and other jihadist groups in
Europe in the wake of 9/11. At that particular juncture, it was indeed fortuitous that Fakhit befriended
Ahmidan, and that one of Ahmidan’s men put the cell
members in touch with Zuhayr, who then functioned
as their intermediary with the Spanish criminals selling explosives in Asturias. However, when clever extremists really have the will, they usually manage to
find a way to actualize their plans, however ineptly—
especially if they have had prior operational experience or receive direct guidance from others who are
more operationally and technically proficient. No one
can accurately predict the future course of events in
an alternate history scenario that never unfolded, but
the notion that Ahmidan and his crew were the only people
in Spain or Europe who could have arranged for Fakhit’s
acquisition of explosives is clearly unwarranted. Indeed,
given the extensive contacts that various cell mem-
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bers continued to maintain with other jihadists, it is
entirely possible that they would have been able to exploit those contacts to find another supplier of explosives even if Ahmidan had never entered the picture.
Whether obtaining dynamite and detonators from another source would have resulted in an IED attack on
the Spanish railway system similar to that on 3/11 is,
of course, anyone’s guess.
Lastly, it is necessary to return to the categorization scheme devised and outlined above, which highlighted the fact that there are many possible levels of
interaction between local cells and networks linked to
al-Qa‘ida or other jihadist groups, and then endeavor
to place the 3/11 cell within that framework. It seems
clear that the Madrid bombers straddled two of the
main categories listed in the scheme first delineated
above. Many of the members of that cell had, in fact,
originally been indoctrinated and recruited by operatives implanted in Europe by al-Qa‘ida or affiliated
networks, above all the GICM. Even so, the cell does
not fall unambiguously into the second category, since
it may not have received ongoing assistance, however
sporadic, from those parent organizations. However,
it does not fall neatly into the third category either, i.e.,
a self-generating cell connected directly or indirectly
to members of foreign jihadist networks, precisely because it was actually formed by several individuals who
had previously been recruited by or otherwise associated
with cells that had been implanted by foreign organizations. Hence, in order to fit the 3/11 case snugly into
the above scheme, a new primary category needs to be
added to it: jihadist cells formed by individuals who
were previously recruited by and/or collaborating
closely with operatives of foreign jihadist organiza-
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tions. The revised scheme, with a new third category,
is as follows:
1. Jihadist “hit teams” sent from abroad.
a. jihadist “hit teams” sent to Europe from elsewhere by al-Qa‘ida Central, usually after
having been provided with specialized instruction (perhaps including in bomb-making skills) in training camps abroad, in order
to launch terrorist operations and attacks
themselves;
b. jihadist “hit teams” sent to Europe from elsewhere by al-Qa‘ida’s nominal or de facto regional affiliates, perhaps after obtaining specialized training in their respective countries,
in order to carry out terrorist operations and
attacks themselves;
c. jihadist “hit teams” sent to Europe from
elsewhere by other veteran jihadist organizations, perhaps after obtaining specialized
training in their respective countries, in order
to carry out terrorist operations and attacks
themselves;
2. ”Local” jihadist cells organized, supported, and/or
directed from abroad.
a. “ local” jihadist cells recruited and trained by
al-Qa‘ida operatives implanted in Europe for
that very purpose, and thereafter receiving
periodic assistance of various types from alQa‘ida Central or its regional affiliates;
b. “local” jihadist cells recruited and trained
by operatives sent by other veteran jihadist groups who were implanted in Europe,
sometimes for that very purpose, and thereafter receiving periodic assistance of various
types from their parent organizations;
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3. Local jihadist cells formed by militants who had previously been radicalized and recruited by, or otherwise closely
associated with, earlier local cells established by operatives
working for foreign terrorist groups.
a. local jihadist cells formed by militants who
were previously members of earlier local
cells established by operatives working for
al-Qa‘ida Central;
b. local jihadist cells formed by militants who
were previously members of earlier local
cells established by operatives working for
al-Qa‘ida’s regional affiliates;
c. local jihadist cells formed by militants who
were previously members of earlier local
cells established by operatives working for
other veteran jihadist groups;
4. Connected “self-generating” European jihadist cells.
a. “self-generating” European jihadist cells that
are in direct contact with operatives from alQa‘ida Central;
b. “self-generating” European jihadist cells that
are in direct contact with operatives from alQa‘ida’s regional affiliates;
c. “self-generating” European jihadist cells that
are in direct contact with operatives from other veteran jihadist groups;
d. “self-generating” European jihadist cells that
are connected indirectly, via intermediaries,
to operatives from al-Qa‘ida Central, its regional affiliates, or other veteran jihadist
groups;
e. “self-generating” European jihadist cells that
are in direct contact with operatives from
other European “self-generating” cells;
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f. “ self-generating” European jihadist cells that
are connected indirectly, via intermediaries,
to operatives from other European “self-generating” cells;
g. “ self-generating” European jihadist cells that
include individuals who are members of alQa‘ida or other foreign terrorist networks;
5. Isolated or fully autonomous “self-generating” European jihadist cells that are not connected in any way to
members of any other jihadist groups or cells.
Hence, the 3/11 cell best conforms to category 3, the
new intermediate category that has now been added
to this scheme. Under no circumstances does it fit into
category 5, as some have suggested.
The 3/11 Cell and Bomb-Making Expertise.
In the context of IED capabilities, the one question
that might be even more important than the issue of
whether the Madrid terrorist cell was linked to other
jihadist organizations, from which they might have
obtained expert assistance directly or indirectly, is
whether any individual cell members had previously
acquired hands-on personal experience or expertise
in manufacturing explosive devices. Unfortunately,
despite the voluminous information available in the
judicial materials relating to the Madrid bombings,
including the exhaustive forensic detail provided in
the indictments and sentences about the bombs themselves and the remains and materials found in various
locales used by cell members, this is not a question
that can be definitively answered. Indeed, it is not
even clear exactly who actually fabricated the devices
that were later placed on the trains. Hence the best
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that one can do at the present time is to draw tentative
conclusions about these crucial matters based on the
incomplete information that is currently available in
the public record.
The first place to begin, however, is with a brief
reconstruction of the process by which the cell members managed to acquire the explosives and detonators that were used in the 3/11 attacks. The main point
that needs to be made is that virtually all of the Goma2 ECO dynamite used in the train attacks and later
detonated in the apartment in Leganés was obtained
from the Conchita Mine in Asturias, which was owned
by the Caolines de Merillés Company and situated in
Calabazos near the Soto de la Barca dam.196 The course
of events that resulted in the use of these materials in
terrorist attacks began in September 2001, when Rafa
Zuhayr and Antonio Toro Castro, two petty criminals
imprisoned in the Centro Penitenciaro in Villabona
(Asturias), befriended each other. After being released
from prison, Toro introduced Zuhayr to his brotherin-law, José Emilio Suárez Trashorras. Unbeknownst
to Toro, Zuhayr had been recruited as a confidential
informant by the UCO of the GC in November 2001,
prior to his release, and his UCO controller was the
aforementioned Víctor. In exchange for a lighter sentence, Zuhayr had agreed to provide information on
various illicit criminal activities to the GC. Initially he
fingered some low-level dealers, who were then investigated and arrested by the police. In February 2003,
however, he told Víctor that Toro intended to sell 150
kilograms of explosives, which had been supplied to
him by Suárez Trashorras, a former mineworker at
the Conchita site. After tracing and locating the two
men, the GC asked Zuhayr to tell the two Spaniards
that he had possible buyers in Madrid, and to obtain a
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jar from them with some plastic explosives, which the
Moroccan then delivered to GC officers at a commercial center in Madrid’s Las Rozas district. Later that
year, however, when he was asked to broker a deal
for those explosives, Zuhayr did not inform his UCO
handler because he saw it as an opportunity to make
a good profit.197
Meanwhile, in the autumn of 2003 Jamal Ahmidan
asked some of his trusted associates to find someone
who could obtain explosives, although he did not
tell them that a jihadist cell he was involved with
needed them to carry out bomb attacks. Rashid Aklif
(nicknamed “El Conejo,” i.e., “the Rabbit,” due to his
pronounced front teeth) remembered Rafa Zuhayr,
a well-connected former associate of his with whom
he had collaborated on previous drug deals.198 When
Akhlif told Zuhayr that he needed explosives, Zuhayr
offered to put him in contact with some criminals he
knew in Asturias who trafficked in explosives and
other illicit materials. After Zuhayr informed Toro
that he had an interested customer, Toro and Suárez
Trashorras drove to Madrid in early October and provided Zuhayr with a detonator, which the latter then
displayed to Akhlif and Ahmidan at a meeting in his
home on October 5, a meeting during which he accidentally triggered the detonator by applying a live
wire to it, thereby slightly injuring everyone present.
Three weeks later, on October 28, a meeting was arranged at a McDonald’s restaurant in Madrid’s Carabanchel district to finalize the deal. At that locale, Zuhayr brought Akhlif, Ahmidan, and an unidentified
person to meet with Suárez Trashorras, Carmen Toro,
and their friend Pablo Álvarez Moya; at the meeting
Akhlif offered to make an exchange, whether of money
or drugs, for 60 kilograms of dynamite. On November
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17, a second meeting occurred, this time between Antonio Toro, Carmen Toro, Suárez Trashorras, Ahmidan, Zuhayr, and Akhlif at another McDonald’s in the
Moncloa district. Although the participants all subsequently claimed that they only spoke of drug deals at
these meetings, this is scarcely believable given their
frequent subsequent phone interactions and the fact
that in just over a month, some of the Asturians’ “couriers” began bringing explosives to Madrid.199
In fact, in January and early February of 2004, three
shipments of explosives were transported from Asturias to Madrid.200 On January 4, Suárez Trashorras
asked one of his subordinates, Sergio Álvarez Sánchez
(nicknamed “Amocachi”), to deliver a 40-kilogram
bag the next day to someone who would be waiting at
the Madrid bus station for it. In the mid-afternoon of
January 5, Amocachi transferred the bag to Ahmidan
and then boarded a bus to return to Oviedo, where he
was paid in 700 euros’ worth of hashish. Four days
later, Suárez Trahorras sent another of his underlings,
Antonio Iván Reis Palicio (nicknamed “Jimmy”), to
deliver a bag of hashish to a “Moor” in Madrid, in exchange for which he would cancel an existing 3,000
euro drug debt. In this case, however, Ahmidan became annoyed with Jimmy during the exchange process, threatened to punch him, and took his mobile
phone and the briefcase from him. Jimmy then returned to Oviedo empty-handed and, fearing retaliation despite Suárez Trashorras’ reassurances, took
off for the Canary Islands. After further interchanges
with Ahmidan and the refusal of another underling
named Iván Granados Peña (nicknamed “Piranha”) to
transport dynamite, on February 6 Suárez Trahorras
sent Gabriel Montoya Vidal (nicknamed “El Gitanillo,” i.e., the “Little Gypsy”) to Madrid to deliver a bag
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full of explosives (in exchange for 1,000 euros). After
arriving at the bus station, Montoya went to the Bar
Virrey and called Ahmidan, using a prearranged code
phrase, after which the latter arrived in a dark Opel
Astra and took the bag. These and the larger quantities of explosives later sold to Ahmidan were pilfered
from the Conchita mine with the connivance of certain
employees there, including a security guard named
Emilio Llano Álvarez, who helped “cook the books”
to cover the missing explosives, and others who accepted bribes for allowing them into the mine and letting them steal various items.
Suárez Trashorras and Carmen Toro got married
in mid-February, and thence went to the Canaries for
their honeymoon (even though the groom continued to
maintain regular phone contact with Ahmidan). This
vacation, however, was rudely interrupted on February 26, when the newlyweds flew precipitously back
to Madrid to meet with Ahmidan, who picked them up
at the airport and drove them to the Chinchón house.
Apparently, Ahmidan now wanted to acquire the rest
of the explosives all at once rather than continuing to
receive them in small increments. After discussing
various matters, which led to a trivial spat over Mecca
Cola between Carmen and Ahmidan that precipitated an Islamist rant by the latter, the parties agreed
to exchange 6,000 euros and 35 kilograms of hashish
for 200 kilograms of Goma-2 ECO. Suárez Trashorras
and his wife then flew back to Asturias.201 Two days
later, Ahmidan drove from Madrid to Asturias with
Muhammad Awlad and Kunja‘a. After hooking up
with Suárez Trashorras in Avilés, they followed the
latter and Montoya to the area of the Conchita mine.
Ahmidan and Suárez Trashorras then walked along a
dangerous, icy path until they reached a certain loca-
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tion near the mine, after which they came back and the
three Moroccans drove to the nearby Carrefour commercial center, where they bought backpacks, sports
bags, flashlights, gloves, batteries, food, and other
items. The trio then returned by car to that same spot
followed by Montoya, who waited nearby in his freezing car, and then spent several hours going back and
forth up and down the path in order to collect the stolen explosives that had been placed there, which they
then stored in their vehicle. All four men then drove
to Avilés, where they stored the materials in Suárez
Trashorras’ garage. They then returned to Conchitas
and collected more explosives, after which they returned to the garage and transferred everything they
had gathered into another car.202
The following day, instead of traveling directly
from Asturias to the Chinchón house to unload his dangerous and illegal cargo, Ahmidan called al-Ghanawi
and asked him to drive north towards Burgos and
bring Rifa‘at, Rashid Awlad, and a “large nail” (the
cell’s code word for a rifle) with him. Ahmidan and
his two companions then drove, in very treacherous
winter conditions, in a caravan of two cars towards
Burgos. On the way, in Sotopalacios, Ahmidan was
recorded driving too fast and was pulled over by GC
officers who—astonishingly given that the car was
stolen and had false registration, that Ahmidan had a
forged Belgian passport, and that knives and other incriminating materials were found in the car—simply
issued fines for three minor offenses and let him go
on his way. The three cars full of Ahmidan’s men then
rendezvoused in Burgos, for reasons unknown. Later
that evening, they drove down from Burgos together in a three-car “caravan of death” to the Chinchón
house, where they unloaded a substantial portion of

105

the bomb materials they had collected.203 In order to
facilitate the storage and concealment of those materials, Ahmidan’s brother Hamid and al-Ghanawi dug
a large hole in the ground under a shed next to the
house, which they lined with a synthetic expanded
polystyrene (EPS) material called “porespán” and
then covered it in such a way that it was indistinguishable from the soil around it.204
It is at this crucial point that vital details about the
fabrication of the bombs become somewhat murky,
in particular exactly when this process commenced
and precisely who actually constructed the devices
that were used on 3/11. There is no doubt, however,
that the Chinchón house had been owned since 1997
by Nayat Fadl Muhammad, the wife of Muhammad
Nidal, a Syrian who was arrested along with Abu
Dahdah and other al-Qa‘ida cell members in November 2001, or that it had thence been rented by Nidal’s
brother Walid al-Taraki to the Moroccan jihadist alMaymuni in 2002. After he moved out, the property
was listed for rent by the Arconsa company (owned
by the Rustam brothers from Syria), where Fakhit
worked selling real estate.205 Apparently, Ahmidan
himself began hanging out at the property as early as
November 2003, although he did not officially rent it
(under the pseudonym Yusuf ibn Salah) until January
2004. At some point he also began holding weekend
get-togethers there with his friends and co-conspirators, including Fakhit, Zugham, the Awlad brothers,
Amghar, and ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Zabak (nicknamed
“El Químico,” i.e., “the Chemist”), another Moroccan
from Tangiers who had an academic background in
the chemical sciences.206 The general consensus of the
Spanish police investigators is that it was not until a
week or so before the attacks that members of the cell
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actually began manufacturing the IEDs, and it was not
until the night before that the phones were activated
and the timers and detonators tested. In this connection, some have claimed that Ahmidan told many of
his closest associates to stay away from the Chinchón
house in the 2 weeks prior to the 3/11 attacks.207 Nevertheless, both eyewitness testimony and forensic
evidence of various kinds, including fingerprints and
DNA residues, demonstrated that several associates
of Ahmidan and Fakhit had spent time at that locale
in recent months. Among these were Ahmidan and
Fakhit themselves, Jamal’s brothers Hisham and Hamid, Zugham, al-Zabak, Awnani, Abu Shar, and alGhanawi.208
However that may be, a lack of specific and verifiable information, due in part to the fact that those who
might have shed light on these matters “martyred”
themselves in Leganés, has made it practically impossible for outsiders to determine exactly who was
entrusted with building the bombs. As a result, there
has been an understandable degree of unconfirmed—
and perhaps unconfirmable—speculation about who,
in fact, was directly involved, whether by serving as
the primary bomb maker(s) or by carrying out various
peripheral tasks, which has in turn led to the promulgation of contrasting theories, conspiratorial or
otherwise. For example, certain Spanish policemen
operated under the assumption that unscrupulous
miners who were familiar with explosives, like Suárez
Trashorras, showed Ahmidan how to make bombs.209
In contrast, two Spanish journalists have suggested
that once the cell members had acquired the dynamite
and detonators, all they had to do was follow the instructions found in an online al-Qa‘ida manual that
they had downloaded from the Internet, just as the
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2003 Casablanca bombers had earlier done.210 Other
analysts, instead, have implied that certain individuals within the jihadist milieu that seem to have had
the requisite levels of technical knowledge—such as
Muhammad the Egyptian or Sa‘ad Husayni, head of
the GICM’s military committee and an explosives expert—may have provided guidance if not hands-on
assistance.211 On the other hand, some observers with
a more conspiratorial mindset have hypothesized that
the cell members had obtained such technical assistance from professional bomb makers outside of the
jihadist milieu, whether a group of etarras or personnel associated with various secret services.212 Alas, as
noted above, it is not presently possible to identify
who actually fabricated the explosive devices used
in the Madrid bombings. Hence it is also not yet possible to use the 3/11 case to test our tentative general
hypothesis that, in the absence of experienced bomb
makers, it is far less likely that jihadist cells will be
able to carry out highly destructive IED attacks, much
less longer-term IED campaigns.
Nevertheless, despite these important factual lacunae concerning the bomb-making process and the key
participants in it at various stages, the Madrid case still
serves to highlight many of the issues that are—and
are likely to remain—vitally important for assessing
the operational capabilities of jihadist cells in Western countries, including the potential IED threat that
they might end up posing. This is especially true with
respect to the importance of their direct and indirect
connections to components of other jihadist networks,
whether they are based in Muslim countries abroad
or elsewhere in Europe itself. In the process, as emphasized above, it enables us to undermine, though
not entirely demolish, certain problematic notions
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currently being peddled by Sageman and his acolytes
concerning the supposedly amateurish, unconnected
nature of jihadist cells in the West.
At the same time, the Madrid case also illustrates
just how important blind luck and a host of other serendipitous factors might be in leading to successful
or unsuccessful attacks. After all, the members of the
3/11 cell made numerous mistakes in tradecraft, ranging from engaging in reckless behavior on the eve of
the attacks that could easily have resulted in the derailment of the entire plot due to leaving vital evidence,
both at the scene of the attacks and elsewhere. In the
final analysis, it was perhaps only the much greater
blunders committed by the security forces, including
repeatedly ignoring or failing to act upon vital information obtained from confidential informants or during the course of the decade-long close surveillance
of many of the cell members, that made it possible for
the attacks to be carried out successfully on March 11.
One point that must always be kept in mind is that “to err
is human,” for oftentimes the success or failure of a particular terrorist plot is primarily determined by which side
makes more errors, or more serious errors, or errors at more
crucial junctures. Since in these contexts one is always
dealing with intrinsically flawed human beings and
not perfectly-functioning machines, predictive efforts
undertaken in the counterterrorism realm must never
ignore or minimize human foibles and fallibilities—either our enemies’ or our own.
THE JULY 2006 GERMAN TRAIN BOMBINGS
At 11:00 am on July 31, 2006, two young Lebanese
Islamists residing in Germany exited an apartment
on Peter-Bauer-Strasse and took a train from the Eh-
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renfeld district in Cologne to the city’s central train
station. One of them, Yusuf Muhammad al-Hajj Dib,
then boarded Train RE 12519 from Mönchengladbach
to Coblenz, placed a suitcase with an IED inside in one
of the cars, and then exited the train. The other, Jihad
Hamad, took Train RE 10121 from Aachen to Hamm,
deposited a second suitcase bomb in the car he was
riding in, and exited the train at the Deutz station. AlHajj Dib had set the timing devices in the bombs for
2:35 p.m., at which point RE 12519 would have been
in the vicinity of the Urmiz-Rhein bridge stop and RE
10121 would have been passing the Kamen station.
Had the explosives detonated, 50-60 people who were
in the same car in the former train would likely have
been killed instantly, whereas about 15 would have
been immediately killed in the latter train. However,
a minor mistake made by al-Hajj Dib in the process of
constructing the bombs caused both devices to fail to
detonate, thereby inadvertently saving the lives—according to the German authorities—of perhaps hundreds of people. At 2:55 that same afternoon, both
men left Germany on Turkish Airlines’ flight TK 1672,
bound for Istanbul. They then proceeded to Tripoli,
where al-Hajj Dib’s older brother Khalid Khayr al-Din
al-Hajj Dib (alias Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman) waited for
them. Both terrorists planned to go on to Iraq to wage
jihad against the Americans, but 7 days after the attempted bombings al-Hajj Dib’s father persuaded his
son Yusuf to return to Germany to complete his studies. Two weeks later, the Bundeskriminalamt (Federal
Criminal [Police] Office [BKA]) released the surveillance videos from the Cologne train station, which
apparently caused al-Hajj Dib to panic. Fortunately,
a message sent by the BKA’s liaison officer in Beirut
at 8:51 that same evening to his colleagues back home
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revealed that a Lebanese student in Kiel was planning
to leave Germany hastily and travel to Sweden to stay
with his sister. A special police unit then arrested alHajj Dib in the Kiel central station at 3:53 a.m. After
his arrest, the police searched his student residence at
Steenbeker Weg 20 and found various incriminating
materials.213 His partner Hamad was then arrested in
Lebanon.
It soon became clear that Yusuf al-Hajj Dib and his
brother Khalid had been radicalized quite some time
before, since the police found last wills and testaments
on the former’s computer prepared by both of them,
in the latter’s case dating to the end of 2005. Indeed,
Khalid’s home in Sweden was said to be a meeting
place for Islamist extremists.214 On the other hand,
Yusuf seems to have played an instrumental role in
radicalizing Hamad and involving him in this failed
terrorist plot. According to the testimony of Hamad,
he first became acquainted with al-Hajj Dib through
his cousin, after which the duo began exchanging
emails and phone calls. In April 2006 Hamad traveled
from Cologne to Kiel, where al-Hajj Dib was taking
a university preparatory course for foreign students,
and temporarily moved in with him. Al-Hajj Dib immediately began showing the impressionable Hamad
jihadist propaganda, including videos of mujahidin in
combat, speeches by Bin Ladin broadcast on al-Jazira,
fatwas condemning both the U.S. invasions of Muslim
countries, and the publication of the cartoons of Muhammad by a Danish newspaper (which Hamad had
never seen before).215 He then began urging him to join
the struggle, insisting that his services were needed
and asking if he would be willing to participate in
an attack. By the late spring of 2006, Hamad himself
had fully embraced al-Qa‘ida’s global jihadist ideology, crammed his laptop with jihadist materials, and
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was posting messages on a jihadist blogsite under the
name “deutscherhamad” (“German Hamad”), using a
picture of Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi to identify himself.
As Hamad later put it, “Yusuf had me in his thrall.”216
Moreover, according to Hamad, al-Hajj Dib was already trawling the Internet for instructions about how
to make bombs, and by mid-May the pair had begun
planning terrorist attacks in Germany. Their original
plan had been to set off bombs in a packed stadium
during the June-July Fédération International de Football Association (International Federation of Association Soccer [FIFA]) World Cup matches, or perhaps (if
photos found in Hamad’s cell phone are indicative)
in Cologne’s city center. In June, al-Hajj Dib showed
Hamad a video in Arabic, entitled “The Use of the
Gas Canister as an Explosive Charge,” that he had
downloaded from a jihadist website, a video that provided relative amateurs with instructions about how
to use materials obtained from building supply stores
to make bombs that would be cheap to manufacture
and highly destructive in their effects.217 The two then
endeavored to follow those instructions by purchasing two canisters of propane gas labeled “Tyczka”
from Bauhaus stores (one in Cologne and the other
in Frechen), alarm clocks, and batteries in a One Euro
department store in their neighborhood, and four and
a half liters of gasoline and diesel fuel from a nearby
Shell garage. They then used the assembled ingredients to fabricate bombs that Hamad initially admitted
were designed “to kill as many people as possible.”218
Finally, al-Hajj Dib attached an alarm clock to a cable
to test whether the Christmas light bulbs he had gotten would light up, which they did, thereby seemingly
demonstrating that the clock could ignite the device.
Tests later conducted by the Bundesanstalt für Ma-
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terialforschung und-Prüfung (Federal Institute for
Material Research and Testing [BAM]) revealed the
devastating impact that such devices could potentially have, since if they were also filled with oxygen,
they could produce a fireball with a diameter of up to
15 meters and discharge shrapnel that could reach as
far as 100 meters. If diesel was added to the mixture,
as al-Hajj Dib and Hamad had done, the size of the
fireball could be further augmented.219 To make matters worse, the pair had added bags of corn starch to
one of the suitcase bombs so that the powder therein
would be transformed by the explosion into a type of
napalm that would have covered the passengers with
a scorching oil film.220 That is why the German authorities concluded that, had the two devices exploded, it
could have been one of the worst Islamist terrorist attacks on European soil.
Unlike in the case of the Madrid bombings, fortunately, there are far fewer mysteries about the provenance of the information used by the German train
bombers to fabricate their suitcase bombs, and there
was no doubt at all that they themselves constructed
the devices. However, chemists at the BKA believed
that the video lacked certain vitally important information that limited its usefulness for novices unfamiliar with pressurized gases. As a result, due to the
way the devices were constructed, it would have been
impossible for them to detonate because the mixture
of gasoline and oxygen that was needed to ignite
them was absent. In short, the two would-be jihadists
were unable to insert a specific oxygen mixture into
the bottles (a technique shown in the video), so there
was only “one fuel and one adequate ignition source,”
which in lieu of an oxidizing agent is not enough for
a functioning bomb.221 Indeed, according to Bodo Ple-
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winsky, an explosives expert, “the bombs were built
rather amateurishly.”222 Later, Hamad contradicted
his earlier testimony by claiming that the pair had intentionally placed nonfunctioning suitcase devices in
the trains as a protest against the Danish publication
of the Muhammad cartoons, but this belated claim is
scarcely credible, given all of the other indicators that
he and al-Hajj Dib had planned to carry out a mass
casualty attack.
Hence it is clear that the bomb plot initiated by the
two men failed simply because they had made a crucial technical mistake that prevented the devices they
had constructed from exploding. This case therefore
suggests that, in the absence of requisite levels of technical proficiency, it will remain difficult for would-be
jihadists to carry out successful IED attacks, which
is exactly what one would expect. On the one hand,
experts often find technical mistakes in the bombmaking manuals posted on the Internet, which would
obviously create problems even if particular individuals followed those recommendations precisely. On
the other, rank amateurs may not be able to follow
the instructions in manuals to the letter, especially if
they are somewhat complicated, even if the information therein turns out to be accurate. In short, if a combination of deficiencies in operational tradecraft and
built-in technical limitations is likely to undermine the
ability of inexperienced jihadist cell members to carry out even one highly destructive IED attack, these
same obstacles would surely inhibit their prosecution
of longer-term IED campaigns.
A few final remarks should be made about the apparent international connections of the two German
train bombers, even though those connections might
have had no direct relevance, at least in this particular
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instance, to their efforts to fabricate IEDs. Hamad initially claimed that their bomb attacks were motivated
by anger over the publication of the Muhammad cartoons. However, it soon became clear that this was a
bogus rationale, given that al-Hajj Dib and several of
his relatives, even those back in Lebanon, had long
embraced radical Islamist and pro-jihadist ideologies.
At most, then, the cartoons simply provided one more
pretext, not that any were needed given their worldview, to justify their pre-existing desire to carry out
attacks on the “infidels.” In actuality, as journalist
Hubert Gude notes, al-Hajj Dib and Hamad can “no
longer be assumed to be two simple-minded Lebanese
students who had mutated into extremists in Germany
on their own initiative,” since “[a]ccording to Hamad,
the militant duo maintained close contacts with radical warriors of God [Gotteskriegern], both at home and
abroad.”223
Among the groups that al-Hajj Dib may have been
indoctrinated and/or influenced by, both in Lebanon
and in Germany, was the Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party [HT]), which was originally
founded in Jordan in the 1950s but is now headquartered in London and has branches throughout Europe and Central Asia. The ultimate agenda of this
cult-like group is extremely radical and thoroughly
anti-democratic and anti-Western: to re-establish the
Caliphate and thence complete the Islamization of the
dar al-harb through a combination of da‘wa (missionary
work) and armed jihad.224 Although the organization
publicly claims to be nonviolent, its actual view is that
it is permissible for Muslims to wage “defensive jihad” anytime that Islam comes under attack, whereas
“offensive jihad” can only be undertaken after the reestablishment of the Caliphate, since only a legitimate
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Caliph can authorize it. Moreover, there is evidence
that HT has frequently served as an ideological incubator for individual Muslims who thence went on
to join jihadist groups, which raises the question of
whether the organization functions, inadvertently or
consciously, as a kind of de facto “transmission belt”
for jihadist organizations. However that may be, the
German authorities were sufficiently alarmed about
HT’s openly anti-Semitic activities that they officially
banned the group on January 15, 2003.225 Nevertheless, no evidence has yet been forthcoming that HT,
as an organization, played a direct role in radicalizing
al-Hajj Dib or Hamad, although its extremist doctrines
may have indirectly exerted an impact upon them.226
In any case, al-Hajj Dib was an Islamist fanatic who
already admired the 9/11 hijackers when he first arrived in Germany, so much so that in the fall of 2004 he
visited the al-Quds mosque in Hamburg, where ‘Ata’
and several of his fellow plotters had once prayed.
Afterwards, when al-Hajj Dib returned to Kiel, he reportedly mimicked the recruitment methods adopted
by the 9/11 terrorists, e.g., by organizing a prayer
circle with like-minded students and making contacts
with Islamists at the ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab mosque on
Kiel’s Diedrichstrasse, a notorious meeting place for
Islamist radicals that drew its ideological inspiration
from the teachings of Yusuf al-Qaradawi. At that same
mosque, he met German-Moroccan shop owner Ridwan al-H., an alleged al-Qa‘ida courier who had links
to militants in London and was reportedly entrusted
with delivering messages to the ex-wife of Sa‘id bin alHajji, a member of the Hamburg terrorist cell.227 There
are also many indications that al-Hajj Dib and Hamad
were subsequently inspired by the brutal campaigns
of violence carried out in Iraq by al-Zarqawi, whose
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al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad organization had established
an elaborate support network in Europe, above all in
Germany. Indeed, one of their proclaimed motives for
attempting the suitcase bomb attacks was supposedly
to avenge the recent death of al-Zarqawi at the hands
of the Americans. There is no evidence, however, that
the pair had tangible links to the Zarqawi network in
Germany. Even so, the German authorities have come
to believe that the attempted train bombings might
have been a test of the commitment of al-Hajj Dib
and Hamad, who in the event of success could have
qualified themselves to participate in future al-Qa‘ida
missions in Iraq. The evidence cited in support of this
claim was that, in an email he sent to Hamad 6 weeks
before the attack, al-Hajj Dib wrote that they would
need to be patient for a little longer “until we have totally made it and passed the initiation test. Then we’ll
travel to Iraq together.”228
Lastly, some have suggested that the German suitcase bomb plot was covertly initiated or sponsored by
a Sunni Lebanese jihadist organization called Fath alIslam (Islamic Conquest), which broke away from a
pro-Syrian jihadist group called Fath al-Intifada (Uprising Conquest) and established its base in the Nahr
al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp in Beirut.229 The reason is that Yusuf’s brother Saddam al-Hajj Dib was
not only a jihadist militant and a suspect in the train
bombing scheme, but also a very high-ranking member of the Fath al-Islam group who was killed in May
2007 in the course of fighting against the Lebanese
Army.230 The problem with this theory is that the Fath
al-Islam group appears not to have been officially established until several months after the summer 2006
train bombings, although it is possible that jihadist elements from earlier Lebanese organizations that later
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coalesced in Fath al-Islam might have played some
behind-the-scenes role which is presently unclear.
At the time of this writing, however, this hypothesis
lacks evidentiary support.
Whatever organizational connections these two
suitcase bombers might have had, it is clear from their
eventual failure that none of those connections provided them with sufficient wherewithal—in the form
of professional bomb-making instruction or handson training—to enable them to resolve the technical
glitches that prevented their artisanal devices from exploding. Hence it must be assumed that the sum total
of their bomb-making knowledge was derived from
the aforementioned video (and perhaps other materials) that they downloaded from the Internet. In that
sense, it might be irrelevant whether this particular
duo did or did not constitute a genuine self-generating
jihadist cell, and also whether there were other German or Lebanese members of their small group (some
of whom had at various points been dubbed the “third
man” and the “fourth man” by the German press),
questions that cannot yet be answered with certainty.
Even so, this case highlights the fact that, in lieu of
at least a minimal amount of bomb-making training
or experience, would-be jihadists will generally find it
difficult to fabricate effective IEDs.
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PART IV:
CONCLUSION
At the risk of disappointing readers, it should be
emphasized at this juncture that the purpose of the
above analysis has not been to answer definitively the
question of whether small jihadist cells in the West will
normally be capable of carrying out highly destructive
improvised explosive device (IED) attacks or, worse
still, a series of such attacks that effectively constitute
a veritable IED campaign. Given the uniqueness of
every case, and the varying skill and capability levels
of the perpetrators who may be involved, especially
with respect to IED fabrication, it is not possible to
make such a general determination, much less—as social scientists often futilely presume to do—actually
predict the course of future events. Hence it would be
problematic, to say the least, to offer the sort of unequivocal recommendations that purport to provide
an actionable guide for policymakers or intelligence
personnel. In the final analysis, there are probably
far too many contingent factors involved to be able
to draw definitive conclusions that will be applicable
in every context, so the most that one can reasonably
hope to do is help illuminate and identify the crucial
factors involved, not all of which will necessarily be
operative in particular cases, and thereby hopefully
make a small contribution to the formulation of better educated guesses about likely probabilities. (Note,
moreover, that quantifying these sorts of “guesstimates” does not necessarily make them any more accurate or predictive, i.e., “scientific,” despite their superficial façade of precision.) In short, the aim herein
has been far more modest: to examine two recent cases
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of attempted IED attacks in Europe, operations which
had very different results, in an effort to highlight and
illustrate some of the key factors that might affect the
effectiveness of future jihadist IED attacks in the West.
Yet even though no formal hypothesis testing or
predictive claims are involved, a number of provisional conclusions can hopefully be drawn that may
prove useful. First, small groups of amateurs without
tangible connections to experienced terrorist groups are
unlikely to be able to carry out sustained campaigns of IED
attacks over a significant period, even if they do successfully manage to launch one or two very destructive attacks.
In general, their built-in limitations in terms of access
to resources and technical capabilities, coupled with
probable deficiencies in tradecraft, will seriously inhibit their operational effectiveness, including their
ability to carry out an extended series of IED attacks.
In fact, such limitations might prevent them from carrying out even a single successful IED attack, as the
example of the German train bombers indicates. This
is not, however, a certainty, since such amateur groups
might be unusually lucky or simply end up making
less egregious blunders than their counterparts in the
security forces. Moreover, if even one cell member
happens to possess the requisite levels of bomb-making experience or expertise, the group might be able to
pull off one or more bloody attacks despite its general
lack of professionalism. In such a context, serendipity
often plays a role.
Second, jihadist cells whose members are linked in
various ways to veteran terrorist organizations, or perhaps
even to experienced criminal networks, are arguably much
more likely to be able to carry out successful IED attacks
and campaigns than those who are members of unconnected
or unaffiliated groups. This is because it is more prob-
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able in these situations that they will establish more
contacts and interactions with people who can muster sufficient resources, operate well clandestinely,
or perhaps even provide hands-on training in bomb
making, all of which could augment their capabilities
far beyond what might normally be expected.
Third, small cells that happen to include or interact directly with individuals with bomb-making experience are
more likely to be able to carry out destructive IED attacks
and longer-term IED campaigns. This would appear to
be a self-evident proposition, though many other factors are of course also involved.
Fourth, one can never overlook the possibility that, in
certain instances, lucky or talented amateurs might nonetheless succeed in launching devastating IED attacks or
campaigns despite all of the odds against them, not the least
of which are those related to their own likely commission of
serious errors in tradecraft. The probabilities of this occurring, however, are relatively low. That is the good
news.
It would be much more reassuring, from a security standpoint, if one could conclude that only jihadist cells made up of veteran terrorists who are linked
directly and organically to wider networks would be
able to carry out successful IED attacks or campaigns
in Western countries. Although these connected cells,
all things being equal, are surely more likely to be able
to do so than small groups of amateurs, such a smug
assumption would be rash and premature. Indeed, it
should instead be assumed that, in at least a few cases,
amateur “bunches of guys” without any connections to
foreign terrorist networks, and thus relatively deficient in
terms of resources and expertise, will nevertheless succeed
in perpetrating bloody mass casualty attacks with IEDs.
After all, the historical record provides examples of
just such attacks. That is the bad news.
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However, that same historical record has repeatedly revealed, in contradistinction to the claims of
Sageman and especially Atran, that as yet there have
been very few actual examples of successful attacks, IED or
otherwise, being carried out in the West by unconnected,
fully autonomous cells composed entirely of amateurs. Indeed, such a characterization of the recent and present jihadist threat is in my opinion largely a myth or,
to put it another way, a “ridiculous distortion.”231 As
terrorist plots planned or carried out in Britain have
repeatedly illustrated, information has eventually surfaced that only serves to confirm the interconnections
between local European jihadist cells and veteran terrorist organizations abroad, up to and including the
provision of operational assistance by the latter to the
former—despite official and unofficial initial claims
to the contrary.232 Indeed, most of the cases that have
previously been cited as examples of unconnected
“bottom-up” or “self-generating” jihadist groups,
such as that of the Hofstadgroep (Capital City Group)
in the Netherlands, do not fully conform to this overly
simplistic portrayal, since if nothing else those groups
usually turn out to have extensive linkages to other
jihadist cells in Europe.233 At the very least, such formulations have often been premature and exaggerated since, as has been emphasized above, most such
cases in Europe have in reality been characterized by
a complex combination of bottom-up and top-down
processes.
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